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Introduction
This dissertation studies quality assurance mechanisms that exist on markets where goods
with some unobservable, yet relevant characteristics are being traded. The research questions
in all three chapters are inspired by existing mechanisms. I focus on certification, a mechanism
based on a third party who tests producers and issues, for a fee, a certificate to those who
meet the required quality standard. I also study self-regulation, where producers, rather
than relying on a certifier, form a club, set standards, and monitor each other. Instead of a
certificate, they use the membership label to inform consumers.
The first chapter is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the first attempts to theoretically
compare certification and self-regulation. The motivation comes from the need to understand
why we often see self-regulation in some industries, but certification in others. In some cases
(charities, for example), one may even find the same industry self-regulated in one country
but certified in another. Another puzzle that motivates this study comes from the empirical
evaluation of average quality in self-regulated/certified industries. Predictions from previous
theoretical models (such as Shaked and Sutton, 1981) that self-regulation leads to a reduction
in the number of producers, an increase in prices due to the higher market power of the
remaining producers, and an increase in quality standards, was not confirmed empirically. In
fact, almost all studies reviewed by Kleiner (2006) found no increase in average quality in
services provided by self-regulated professions when compared to certification, and even those
few that did find an increase in average quality also found an increase in prices significantly
larger than the increase in average quality. This discrepancy between theoretical and empirical
observations could be explain by a specific assumption—the fixed distribution of the quality
of producers, which was incorporated into the previous models.
In contrast, I assume that the quality is a choice—both for the regulatory organization
(a certifier or a self-regulatory club) and the producers. The size of the organization is not
directly tied to the standards as in previous models. Thus, self-regulation may, in principle,
lead to the same standards as certification, in equilibrium. I find that when regulatory
organizations have access to perfect and costless testing technology, self-regulation leads to
better results in terms of overall welfare, even though not necessarily higher average quality.
This result seems to favor self-regulation over certification despite (possibly) no improvement
in average quality. However, the testing technology is generally imperfect and expensive, and
it is not clear whether this result holds when the assumption about the testing technology is
relaxed. Some research (Nunez 2001, 2007) seems to suggest that self-regulation is particularly
vulnerable to internal problems and the enforcement of quality standards. Since imperfect
testing technology cannot be incorporated into my model, I provide conjectures about its
possible impact on the results reported here.
The second chapter, a joint work with Tomáš Konečný, studies a Fair Trade labelling
scheme. The Fair Trade organization stipulates several requirements for certified commodities
(e.g., coffee) which their producers (farmers) and especially traders must fulfill to qualify for
the label. These conditions, such as a minimal price for the farmers, pre-financing and
investment into local communities, were allegedly designed to primarily benefit farmers in
developing countries. However, as the number of commodities and amounts traded grow,
questions about the Fair Trade (FT) rationale have been asked. It is disputed, for example,
what impact FT has on non-participating farmers and what the consequences of the minimal
guaranteed price are.
We build a formal model to investigate these questions. We show that the FT scheme
without the price guarantee (but with other benefits to the farmers) is beneficial if it increases
the total amount of the commodity traded. Introducing the price guarantee does not benefit
any farmers but it may increase participation in FT in case non-participating farmers are
facing a local monopsonist.1
The third chapter is motivated by a form of regulation of “organic” (in the USA) or “bio”
(in the EU) food. A product may be sold as organic only if its producer is certified by an
accredited certifier. However, consumers typically learn only that the product is certified, not
by whom. Even though consumers may, in principle, learn who the certifier is, it is difficult
to establish a reputation for each of them, since there are a large number of them (e.g.,
there are 55 certifiers in the USA only). This regulatory structure seems to be motivated by
the argument that competition between certifiers lowers the price of certification, which will
eventually lower the prices of organic food and will benefit the consumers.
There are two reasons why this logic is likely to be invalid. First, as was already shown
(Strausz, 2004), the high price of certification guarantees honesty of the certifier. When
certification fees are low, the certifier may find it more profitable to accept a bribe from a
producer instead of honestly revealing the truth. Second, the certification fee might affect the
entry decisions of the producers. I show in a formal model that depending on the quality of the
testing technology, inexpensive certification may attract low-quality producers. To guarantee
that only high-quality producers (ie., those who are indeed producing organic goods) are
present on the market, a sufficiently high fee is necessary. This fee is decreasing in the quality
of testing. I also show that welfare is maximized in the separating equilibrium (ie., when only
high-quality producers are obtaining the certificate). A monopoly certifier would choose fee
too high, yet severe competition may lead to too low fees. These results thus should serve
as a warning. Introducing a large number of certifiers may lower the certification fee but it
may also lead to low-quality certifiers obtaining a certificate and thus “spoiling” the pool of
organic products for consumers.
All three chapters, while while being motivated by anecdotal evidence and available em-
pirical evidence, present theoretical models attempting to understand in more detail various
certification and self-regulatory systems. Due to globalization and the lengthening of supply
chains, there is an increasing number of characteristics that are not observable to those who
are purchasing the good. Certification and self-regulation may be effectively used to overcome
trust issues when other mechanisms like repeated purchases or warranties are not available
or relevant. A deeper understanding of the properties of certification and self-regulation is
necessary for successful regulation and governmental oversight of the testing agencies.
1The commodity that motivates our study in particular is Fair Trade coffee. It is often the case that coffee
farmers are locally isolated and unable to find alternative middlemen and thus have to sell to the local trader,





I compare certification and self-regulation, two widely used quality assurance mechanisms in
markets where consumers do not observe the quality of goods. Certification is a mechanism
in which an external firm offers a certificate to producers who undergo a testing procedure,
issues the certificate if they meet the certifier’s standards and collects the certification fee.
Self-regulation is a mechanism in which a club of firms in the industry adhere (or not) to
a self-imposed code of conduct and benefit from the club’s reputation. I show that if the
testing technology is perfect and costless, the choice of standards and fees by the certifying
organization (CO) is welfare inferior, while the self-regulatory organization (SRO) chooses
a welfare optimal fee, and I identify conditions under which the SRO also chooses optimal
standards. If the testing technology is costly and imperfect, this result is not necessarily valid
and depends on the difference between the costs of the testing technology available to the CO
and SRO.
Keywords: Quality assurance, asymmetry of information, certification, self-regulation
JEL Classification: D02, D45, D71, D72, D82, L14, L15, L21, L38, L43, L51
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2 CHAPTER 1. CERTIFICATION AND SELF-REGULATION
1.1 Introduction
I study markets in which producers have a choice over the quality they produce, but this
quality is unobservable for consumers. This asymmetry of information often leads to an
adverse market outcome such as only low-quality products being traded even if high quality
is valued by the consumers (Akerlof, 1970 and Leland, 1979). There are several mechanisms to
prevent such adverse outcomes. These mechanism are, among others, producer’s reputation
(via repeated interaction), advertising, warranties, certification, and self-regulation.
When the information asymmetries are particularly severe,1 certification and self-regulation
often seem to work better than other mechanisms, at least theoretically. This is so because
both of these mechanisms are based on a third party—an organization whose reputation re-
places the need for individual reputation building by each producer, which simplifies learning
for consumers. This organization must be able to observe the (signal of) quality itself. In
the case of certification, such an organization is an external, possibly but not necessarily
profit-maximizing, firm. In the case of self-regulation, the organization is formed by a group
of producers in the industry. Typically, such an organization sets some quality standard qS
and a fee for testing the producer. When a producer applies for a certificate/membership,
it pays the fee, the quality of its products is inspected and if it meets the quality standards,
he is allowed to use the certificate or have the membership. The mechanisms with which a
single organization’s reputation may replace individual reputations is described in papers by
Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) and Biglaiser (1993). Even though the honesty of this orga-
nization cannot be taken for granted (see Strausz, 2005 for certification and Nunez, 2001 for
self-regulation), both mechanisms are widely used as a means of quality assurance for many
professions like doctors, lawyers and accountants (Kleiner, 2006), environmental aspects of
many industries (Podhorsky, 2006) and charities (Ortmann, Svitkova, and Krnacova, 2005).
Even though the honesty of a single organization, such as a certifier or a self-regulating
organization, is easier to sustain, this organization may use its monopoly position to extract
rents (see Shaked and Sutton, 1981 and Lizzeri, 1999 for theoretical arguments). Presumably,
the rent-extraction motive might be stronger in the case of a self-regulatory organization
(SRO), because such an organization sets standards to benefit its members. Yet, I show that
such intuition may be wrong. The profit maximizing CO aims to extract rents from producers
who in turn try to extract rents from consumers. These distortions may be larger than those
caused by self-regulation.
There is empirical evidence that when the regulation of an industry is changed from
certification to self-regulation, the average quality of goods may increase only slightly, if at
all (Kleiner, 2006). This evidence is sometimes used to argue that self-regulation is not a
better form of regulation than certification (ibid.). I show formally that such reasoning is
misleading, because enforcing high quality may be inefficient when consumers’ valuation of a
marginal increase in quality is smaller than the marginal costs required to produce it. Thus,
higher standards do not necessarily translate into higher welfare. Comparison of certification
and self-regulation thus must be based on welfare, which depends on both prices and quality
standards, not just the latter.
1Examples include situations where there are many producers and consumers who shop infrequently so
that they cannot establish individual reputations; when warranties do not work due to the moral hazard, etc.
One can think of charities (a large number of various charities with quality unobservable before or after the
donation), organic farmers, and also lawyers, dentists and other doctors; see Ortmann, Svitkova, and Krnacova
(2005), Kleiner (2006), Shaked and Sutton (1981).
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I argue that although certification and self-regulation are very similar,2 the main difference
comes from the different objectives of the CO and SRO. While certifying organizations are
firms not directly linked with the producers, the self-regulatory organizations are formed
by groups of producers and the SROs themselves do not generate any profit but they are
motivated by profits of its members. I focus on how this difference in objectives impacts
the choice of standards and the fees. I show that because the SRO itself does not aim at
extracting rent from the producers, it chooses a lower fee than a profit-maximizing CO.
Since certifiers are often not-for-profit organizations, I extend the model to analyze other
objective functions. In particular, I study the cases when certifiers maximize revenue of
producers, number of certified producers, or standards. I also analyze the behavior of the
SRO in the case when it can directly limit the number of members.3
These results are based on two related key assumptions. First, I assume that the testing
technology is perfect. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis but may introduce a
bias in favor of one of the institutions. If the internal incentive structure in the presence
of imperfect testing technology makes it more difficult for the SRO to enforce high quality
standards (see Nunez, 2001 and 2007) in contrast to certification (De and Nabar, 1991), then
the benefits of self-regulation may completely disappear. One thus may expect self-regulation
to work better and to be more prevalent in industries where quality is easier for experts to
observe, while one may expect certification in industries where quality evaluation is more
difficult. In the concluding section, I also discuss the possibility to model the differences in
standards enforcement as differences in costs.
This analysis applies to a variety of professions and industries. In many countries, lawyers,
doctors, dentists, accountants and architects are self-regulated (Kleiner, 2006). Certification
is widely used in non-profit sectors, such as hospitals and charities (Ortmann, Svitkova,
and Krnacova, 2005). It is also used by for-profit firms to document environmental aspect
of production (Podhorsky, 2006) and by professionals to prove expertise in the industry
(Financial Risk Manager, Microsoft Certified Professional and many others). While it seems
that if one industry or profession is self-regulated in one country, it will be self-regulated
in other countries (typically true for lawyers, doctors and accountants), there certainly are
exceptions. For example, charities are mostly certified throughout Western Europe and the
USA, yet there exists a self-regulatory organization of charities in the Czech Republic. Also,
as Kleiner (2006) documents, it is not unusual to find a change in the form of regulation
from certification to self-regulation. This paper is a first step towards understanding these
differences and explaining why certain industries are persistently self-regulated or certified.
The next section briefly reviews the literature and the basic assumptions of the model.
The third section provides the model and its analysis. Next, I discuss the impact of my
assumptions on the result and possible extensions and suggestions for future research. The
final section concludes. Most of the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2In both cases, the consumers observe a single message (label of membership or certificate) and face in
principle the same information asymmetry; producers can choose their quality and whether they will apply for
a certificate or membership. The producers also have the same incentives to “cheat”—obtain a certificate of a
quality they do not produce.
3In many countries, anti-trust regulations allow quality standards (e.g., difficulty of tests, length of super-
vised practice), but often do not allow direct regulation of the number of members in the organization. As
there are exceptions to this rule (e.g., notaries in some countries), I analyze the impact of such regulations.
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1.2 Certification and Self-Regulation
I generalize the model of self-regulation by Shaked and Sutton (1981). They construct a
model of self-regulation in which the quality produced by each potential producer and the
distribution of producers is fixed. This allows them to focus on the incentives of the SRO to
choose minimal standards without imposing a specific objective function of the self-regulatory
organization (SRO). However, the fixed distribution of potential producers implies that the
SRO may improve its standards only by restricting its size. Instead, I analyze a model in
which quality produced and standards are choice variables.
Such simplifying assumptions allows me to focus on the incentives of the SRO/CO to set
standards without a direct link between quality and number of producers. This generalization
has its cost: I need to assume an objective function. Since the SRO is formed and managed
as a non–profit organization by its for-profit members, I assume that the SRO maximizes the
total profit of its members.4
This approach differs from other papers on self-regulation. Nunez (2001) and Nunez (2007)
assume that the SRO cares about its own reputation and possible bribes. He assumes that
the SRO has a fixed size and pre-determined standards. Its members decide on the individual
extent of cheating and the regulatory organization decides on the level of enforcement and
whether to inform consumers if it finds cheating. The analysis thus focuses on the enforcement
of standards and not on how standards are established. If revealed cheating reduces the
reputation of the SRO enough, then the SRO does not have sufficient incentives to monitor
its members and thus they are cheating in equilibrium. If a revelation of cheating increases
the value of the SRO’s reputation, then there exists an equilibrium with a positive level
of enforcement and revelation. In addition, if a member may bribe the SRO to not reveal
cheating, there exists an additional, welfare suboptimal equilibrium in which the SRO enforces
the standards but does not reveal the cheating and collects bribes.5
This analysis suggests that the SRO is likely to suffer from internal incentive problems that
prevents it from fully enforcing the standards. However, this result is based on the assumption
that the SRO is motivated by the value of its reputation. If the SRO is motivated by the
profits of its members, it has stronger incentives to enforce the standard, when the profits
of its members depend on it. I focus on the case when the SRO (and also CO) has access
to perfect testing technology.6 Such an assumption greatly simplifies the analysis but also
reduces the impact of the internal structure on quality standards. The results thus obtained
may be sensitive to this assumption and in the concluding section, I discuss how the results
would change if this assumption would be relaxed.
The idea of comparing certification and self-regulation is new in the literature. There is
one notable exception: Shapiro (1986). He focuses on input regulation when higher initial
investment makes production of high quality cheaper. He compares licensing (similar to self-
regulation in our terminology), a requirement to make a minimal investment with certification,
an informational device that reveals investment to the consumers but does not regulate it.
Shapiro shows that licensing and certification benefit high valuation consumers at the expense
4This is not the only option but it seems the most natural one. Other options are discussed in the section
below.
5The outcome depends on the parametrization. For a summary of the results, see p. 225 of Nunez (2007).
6This assumption requires that the CO or the SRO is able to tell whether a product meets requires standards.
This is somewhat weaker than the assumptions of other authors (such as Lizzeri, 1999) that require that the
organization is able to tell the level of quality exactly.
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of low valuation consumers. Shapiro assumes that the consumers are eventually able to learn
the true quality of the products, so even laissez-faire allows some high quality production,
and certification may be welfare worsening because it leads to excessive investment (because
it is used as a signaling device). In Shapiro’s model, there are only two levels of quality,
high and low, and these levels are exogenously given. My model is more general: there will
still be only two levels of quality traded on the market, but those levels will be endogenously
determined. The model also differs in the assumption about the ability of consumers to learn
the true quality. I assume that an individual producer’s quality is completely unobservable.
I analyze the case where there exists only one signal of quality to the consumers—
membership in a SRO or a certificate from a CO. This structure is very common (Kleiner,
2006; Lizzeri, 1999; Svitkova and Ortmann, 2006) ) but theoretically puzzling because the
certifier (or the SRO) learns more than only whether the producer meets the standard. Lizzeri
(1999) shows that it is optimal for a profit-maximizing certifier to reveal only a “pass/fail”
signal. In his model, the quality of a product is exogenously given in each period and a
certifier learns the quality perfectly. Among all possible disclosure rules, the “pass/fail” rule
is the most profitable one if the quality may have negative value to consumers. If even the
expected value of quality is negative for the consumer, “pass/fail” is the only optimal rule.
The model by Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) shows that the informational advantage
of a certifier (middleman in their terminology) does not need to come from perfect testing
technology, but from his ability to aggregate information from consumers and using this
information to “drop” (remove the certificate) from producers who attempt to cheat in quality.
1.3 Model
I model certification and self-regulation as a game with three groups of heterogeneous players:
consumers, producers and either a certifying or self-regulatory organization (CO/SRO). I
generalize previous models of certification by assuming that the quality of production can be
of any value from zero to infinity. I study the case in which consumers cannot observe any
information about a producer’s quality (no individual reputation), but they know the average
quality of certified products.
I assume that the certifying or self-regulatory organization has access to costless perfect
testing technology7 and sets standards to qS ∈ R, qS ≥ 0. Observing this standard, pro-
ducers face a choice between producing zero quality (without a certificate) and quality qS
and applying for a certificate. Thus, similarly to previous research, producers face a binary
choice between high (qs) and low (0) quality,8 but, in contrast to the previous literature, the
levels of quality are endogenously determined. This allows us to compare not only the fees
the CO/SRO will charge, but also the quality standards they will select and enforce. Note
that there will be only two qualities traded on the market (qS for certified products and 0 for
not certified). Moreover, I analyze equilibria in which consumers’ expectations about qS are
7I analyze the case of costly, but still perfect, testing technology in one of the extensions.
8Two assumptions imply that a producer will not produce any other quality than 0 or qS in equilibrium.
First, perfect detection technology means that the certifier does not make mistakes when it evaluates whether
a product is of at least standardized quality. Second, there are no individual reputations of producers.
Relaxing each of these assumptions is likely to lead to a dispersion of quality. For example, in the case of
imperfect testing technology, low-cost firms might produce quality higher than required because it increases
the probability of passing noisy tests. High-cost firms might under-invest into quality hoping that they will
pass nonetheless. It is not clear what will be the overall impact on the average quality.
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fulfilled (rational expectations equilibria).
Apart from the endogenous quality and perfect testing technology, I make the following
assumptions. There is a large number of heterogeneous firms,9 each characterized by a cost
parameter αi ∈ [0,∞); their density is described by a continuous function f(α) and their
distribution by F (α). Each firm has an opportunity to produce one unit of output at quality
q and at costs g(q, α). The cost function g(q, a) is assumed to satisfy
g(0, 0) = gq(0, 0) = gα(0, 0) = 0, g(q, α) > 0,
gq(q, α) > 0, gα(q, α) > 0, gqα(q, a) > 0, gqq > 0 for q > 0, α > 0,
where q is a non-negative real number. These assumptions mean that it is costless to produce
zero quality and that the costs are increasing in quality q and cost type α. Moreover, the costs
are assumed to be convex in the quality and an increase in the standard increases the costs
of high-α (high-cost) producers more than it does for low-α producers. The convexity of the
cost function reflects the assumption that it is increasingly costly to produce higher quality.
Due to the perfect testing technology, only firms that produce standards qS can successfully
pass the test and thus only they can sell their product with the “label” of the CO/SRO.
Products without a “label” are (perceived by consumers as being) of zero quality and are sold
on a separate market.10
Formally, the game has two stages.
1. In the first stage, a CO or SRO publicly announces standards qS and fee C to maximize
its profit (CO) or the total profit of its members (SRO).
2. In the second stage, consumers decide whether to purchase from a certified producer,
taking price p and expected quality q as given. Simultaneously, firms choose how much
to invest into quality, taking price p, fee C and standards qS as given and whether to
apply for a certificate. Price p is set competitively.
1.3.1 Producers and consumers
Since every producer (with cost parameter α) has a zero outside option, he will invest into
quality and certification if and only if
p− C − g(q, α) ≥ 0,
which implies, due to our assumptions on g, the existence of a unique value of parameter
α̃(C, qS , p) such that only producers with α ≤ α̃(C, qS , p) will apply for a certificate, each
investing g(qS , α).
There is a large number of consumers, each willing to buy up to one unit of good. Their
utility depends on the expected11 quality q, price p, their budget M and individual preference
9Each firm thus has insignificant impact on the market and therefore can take market price, quality and
other characteristics as not depending on its own decisions. This also justifies the assumption that producers
do not have individual reputations.
10The zero-quality segment of the market can be interpreted in two ways. First, the certification/self-
regulation can be interpreted as voluntary, and zero-quality segment is a competitive, unregulated market
where producers do not invest into quality. The competitive nature of the market prevents them from making
any profit. Second, certification/self-regulation may be obligatory and producers who do not apply for a
certificate/membership are prevented from operating on the market and thus make zero profit.
11Formally, I analyze a rational expectations equilibrium in which quality expectations are fulfilled.
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for quality β, which is distributed according to the continuous density function w(β) and
distribution function W (β). The consumers can be described by a utility function U(β, M, q),
where β is the parameter describing the consumer, M is his wealth and q is the quality of the
good consumed (zero if no good is purchased on this market). It is assumed that the function
U is continuously differentiable in all its variables. A consumer will prefer a certified product
of expected quality q and of price p if
U(β, M − p, q) ≥ U(β, M, 0), β ∈ [0, 1].
Consumers prefer to have more money rather than less money (UM ≥ 0), they value quality
(Uq ≥ 0) and consumers with higher β value quality less than those with lower β (ie., Uβ ≤
0).12 Thus, there exists a single consumer who is indifferent between buying at price p and
expected quality q, whom we will denote β̃(p, qS). Consumers with β ≤ β̃(p, qS) demand one
unit of good of quality q > 0, while others do not buy anything.
I will assume that there exists a market equilibrium in which supply is equal to the





f(α)dα =⇒ p∗(C, qS).
This equilibrium condition determines price p∗(C, qS). For further analysis, I will use the
“reduced-forms” of functions α̃, β̃, which are denoted by α∗, β∗ and defined as
α∗(C, qS) = α̃(C, qS , p∗(C, qS)), β∗(C, qS) = β̃(p∗(C, qS), qS).
The second stage of the game thus determines price p∗(C, qS) and quantity F (α∗(C, qS)) =
W (β∗(C, qS)) as a function of the standards qS and fee C set in the first stage. Analysis
of the impact of the first stage on the equilibrium levels of prices, supply and demand is
summarized in the following lemma.











An increase in standards qS always increases the equilibrium price
∂p∗(C,qS)
∂qS
> 0, but leads to
a decrease in demand and supply if and only if
gqS (qS , α
∗(C, qS)) >
UqS (β, M − p∗(C, qS), qS)
UM (β, M − p∗(C, qS), qS)
.
Proof of this lemma is provided in the Appendix and uses comparative statics with respect
to qS and C. The result is intuitive: an increase in the cost of certification C translates into
an increase in the price of products p∗, but fewer products are traded because the higher price
12I will assume that the inequalities are strict for q > 0. Moreover, I will assume that Uβ(β, M, 0) = 0
because it simplifies the results without any significant loss of generality. Note that the more usual assumption
Uβq < 0 for q > 0 implies that Uβ < 0, and thus would also be sufficient for the results.
13Further assumptions about g are necessary to show that there exists the highest possible quality traded
q̄s. These conditions are derived in section 3.5.1, where the behavior of the standard maximizing non-profit
certifier is analyzed.
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reduces demand for certified products. The overall impact on the supply is negative because
the price increases less than fee C does and thus overall revenue for the firm p−C decreases,
which also decreases the supply. Further, an increase in the standards increases the value of
the product for the consumer and costs to the firms and leads to an increase in price p. The
impact of an increase in standards on supply and demand can be intuitively seen when the
condition is rewritten as14
gqS (qS , α
∗(C, qS))UM > UqS .
In this form, the left-hand side describes the marginal costs (in utility terms) of an increase
in standards while the right-hand side describes the benefit it has for the consumers. If
the marginal consumers’ benefit is higher than the marginal cost, an increase in standards
generates a positive surplus, which allows further trade and increases equilibrium demand
and supply.
1.3.2 Behavior of the certifier
In the first stage of the game, the organization chooses the standard qS and fee C. I first
focus on the behavior of a profit-maximizing certifier. In Section 1.3.5, I extend our analysis
by analyzing alternative objective functions.
Profit-maximizing certifier









CF (α∗(qS , C)).
The optimal interior choice of standard qS and certification fee C is thus described by the
first order conditions








I assume that there exists an interior solution, which is a maximum.15
Lemma 1.2 In equilibrium, I have

















14For simplicity, I often write U instead of U(β, M − p∗(C, qS), qS), where the arguments are obvious.
15To prove that the solution is a maximum, one would need to verify the definiteness of the matrix of
second order conditions. Given that the expression for α is endogenously based on consumer preferences and
production costs, this would be quite technical. However, from the economical point of view, assuming the
existence of a solution seems reasonable.
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These conditions are intuitive—the profit maximizing behavior of the CO chooses stan-
dards so that the increase in costs for a marginal producer equals the increase in price. Other
certified producers are not relevant for the decision made by certifiers because they make pos-
itive profits. Also, standards are chosen so that the maximum number of producers applies
for certification, given the fee C.
Overall, the certifier’s choice of certification fee and standards can be separated into two
hypothetical parts. First, for any given certification fee C, the certifier chooses standards so




Given the relationship between the certification fee and the number of producers applying
for certification, it then chooses the optimal fee C. This result will be useful later because it
describes the optimal standards even for exogenously given fees C.
1.3.3 Behavior of the self-regulatory organization
I analyze the behavior of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) formed by firms in the industry
that sets standards to maximize the total profit of its members.16 The SRO can reject or
accept its members depending only on their quality of production.17 This allows the SRO to
choose its size by choosing the standards, but not directly. If the SRO maximizes the total
profit of its members, it does not need to charge any fee C, but sets only some standards qS
in order to maximize its profit. Charging positive fees that are then returned to the members
of the organization would not change their behavior and would not affect the results.
Quality restrictions only
Without adding any technical complications, I can analyze a more general problem when the
SRO charges a positive fee C, but the money thus collected belongs to the government. The
problem for the SRO that charges an exogenously given fee C and tries to choose standards





(p(C, qS)− g(qS , α)− C) f(α)dα.









16In general, these organizations set the quality standards based on the preferences of their members. This
leads to some ambiguity in their objective function, since the SROs themselves have not-for-profit status. Thus,
the question is whether the SRO maximizes the profits of their highest/lowest quality members, the average
profit, the total profit, or something else. I start with probably the most realistic and simplest approach of
total profit maximization. Other approaches often lead to corner solutions. For example, maximizing average
profit immediately leads to a zero-size SRO with only the highest quality (lowest costs of quality) firms, unless
there are economically significant fixed costs.
17This means that the SRO has to accept an application from any firm that meets the required standard.
It also implies that the (only) punishment for not meeting the required standards is exclusion from the orga-
nization.
18It is easy to see that there is an interior solution. Clearly, a zero standard implies zero total profit. Also, a
very large standard implies costs larger than the price if the consumers’ valuation of quality is bounded from
above.
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Lemma 1.3 If ∂
2g(qS ,α)
∂α∂qS
> 0, then in the interior solution the SRO chooses standards such
that the marginal costs for a marginal firm (α∗) of its members exceed the relative valuation
of the marginal consumer:





The intuition is that producers with α < α∗ face lower increases in the costs of production
but the same increase in price. Therefore, the SRO chooses standards higher than those that
would equalize the marginal cost and revenue for marginal producer α∗ because such standards
would leave “money on the table”—an increase in standards would increase revenues more
than the costs for all producers. Note that this result holds for any C.
Quality and quantity restrictions
I extend the previous analysis by considering an alternative form of regulation, under which
the SRO is able to restrict the number of its members. This contrasts two possible forms of
regulation of the SRO. In the previous case, the SRO was free to choose standards qS , but
it had to admit every producer who was able to meet this standard. Alternatively, the SRO
might be given the right to select the number of members. In the first case, the marginal
producer will have zero profit. In the second case, even marginal (the highest-cost) member





the function n = α(C, qS) is invertible in C. Thus, by controlling the minimum profit its
members must make, the SRO is able to control the number of members. In such a situation,





(p(C, qS)− g(qS , α)) f(α)dα.
Lemma 1.4 The SRO that can restrict the number of its members directly will still choose
C, qS such that





In fact, I’m comparing standards chosen under the two regimes. The first regime is a form
of regulation that requires the SRO to charge a membership fee C > 0 and the revenue from
these fees belongs to the government. Under the second regime, the SRO enforces minimum
profit C > 0, but does not collect any fees. In both cases, the SRO chooses standards to
maximize the total profit of its members.
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Proposition 1.1 Let’s assume that the first-order conditions are monotonic.19 The SRO
that is able to restrict the number of its members by enforcing a minimum profit constraint
chooses lower quality standards than the SRO that has only quality restrictions at its disposal,
for any fixed fee C.
This result has the following intuitive explanation. Under the quality-only self-regulation,
when considering an increase in quality standards qS , the SRO takes into account only the
impact on the revenues and costs of current members because marginal members make zero
profit. However, under quality-and-quantity regulation, an increase in standards makes some
members leave and this reduces total profit because they made positive (C) profit before
the change. Thus, the marginal costs of increasing standards are higher under quality-and-
quantity regulation; marginal revenues are the same and standards are therefore lower.
Direct comparison of standards between an organization charging a zero fee and a SRO
that works under quality-and-quantity regulation is not possible. The reason is that the sign
of ∂qS∂C is not clear. The structure of this model is general enough to allow for both a positive
and negative sign of ∂qS∂C , depending on consumers’ valuation and the distribution of producers
and consumers (see Example 1.1 in the Appendix).
1.3.4 Welfare analysis
The presence of a CO or SRO improves welfare—without these institutions, assumptions of
unobservable, costly, and endogenous quality, lead to only zero quality products being traded
in the equilibrium. However, since neither a profit-maximizing CO nor SRO take directly into
account the impact of their choice of standards and fees on the consumers, it seems likely
that neither of them leads to a welfare optimal outcome. I start the analysis with the optimal
choice of fee C and standards qS and compare this choice to the behavior of the SRO and
CO. The total welfare is the sum of the profit of the CO/SRO (if any), the profit of producers
and consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus
To compute the consumer surplus, I derive the demand function W (β̃(p, q)).20 First, I find
the marginal consumer β̃(p, q) who is indifferent between buying a product of quality q and
price p :
U(β̃(p, q),M − p, q) = U(β̃(p, q),M, 0).
All consumers with β > β̃(p, q) prefer not to buy, while consumers β ≤ β̃(p, q) will buy. The
demand is thus









Trivially, an increase in quality q leads to an increase in consumer surplus if the price remains
constant.
19This assumption is trivial in the case when there is a unique local optimum.
20In this section, I use again β̃(p, q) instead of β∗(C, qS) as I analyze the consumer surplus that depends on
prices and quality.
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Total welfare
Using the previous definition of consumers’ surplus, I can define total welfare as the sum of
the profit of the certifier, firms and consumer surplus:
W = CF (α∗(C, qS)) +
∫ ∞
p∗(C,qS)




(p∗(C, qS)− g(qS , α)− C) f(α)dα.
Since the certification fee C is a pure transfer that restricts supply and demand even in
the situation where there would be space for trade at zero fee, one can easily show that the
welfare is optimal when the fee is equal to C = 0.
Proposition 1.2 Welfare optimum is reached at the point where C = 0.
Two conditions will be useful for the following analysis. The first condition holds when





gqS (qS , α





This condition is endogenous in this model, because it does not depend only on the prim-
itives of the model, but on α∗ and β∗ as well. Given the general structure of the model, it
is not possible to derive an exogenous condition, except for a specific, numeric examples.21
However, one can gain additional insight under some assumptions. For example, if one as-
sumes that the marginal value of money is constant UM = c > 0, i.e. in the case of quasilinear








































The first two terms on the left hand side represent the monetary value of the difference
between an increase in marginal costs and marginal valuation due to a marginal increase in
the quality. The second two terms represent the change of these costs due to a change in the
supply and demand. The expression on the right hand side would represent a change in the
marginal value of money due to a change in standards, but under the assumption that UM
is constant, it is zero. Thus, Condition 1.1 is essentially equivalent to the requirement that
the marginal costs of producing quality are increasing faster than the marginal valuation of
quality.
Note that there are two competing effects in play. First, a simple increase in quality
increases costs and decreases the marginal value of the good. Second, an increase in quality
21This may be considered an advantage. The condition depends on the structure of the consumer/producer
market and provides insight regardless of the specific structure of this market.
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drives some producers and consumers out (α∗, β∗ decrease), which increases the marginal value
of the good and decreases the marginal costs of producing, since the remaining consumers
value the goods more and the remaining producers are able to make the good at lower costs.
Condition 1.1 requires that the first effect is stronger then the second one: marginal costs are
increasing fast enough when the required quality increases.
The second condition holds if producers appropriate less than the marginal change in












Note that since this condition characterizes only marginal effects, it is theoretically possible
that the condition does not hold: when standards change, the profit of the producers may
increase more than the surplus of the consumers. Again, this condition is endogenous in this
model. The condition holds if consumers (and thus also demand) is insensitive to the changes
in standards, while costs and then also prices are sensitive.
The comparison of standards and welfare
Even though the SRO chooses zero fee C, one cannot in general expect its choice of quality
standard qS to be welfare-optimal because it only maximizes the profit of its members. I
confirm this intuition by showing that only when the SRO can fully extract a marginal
increase in consumer surplus due to an increase in standards, will the choice of standard be
welfare-optimal.
Proposition 1.3 The standards chosen by the SRO charging zero fee, C = 0, are welfare
optimal only if the producers are able to fully appropriate the marginal increase in consumer
surplus in equilibrium, i.e., when Condition 1.2 holds with equality for C = 0.
In the case the SRO is not able to do so, it will choose welfare-suboptimal standards.22
The following result shows when such standards will be lower than welfare-optimal.
Proposition 1.4 Assume fee C = 0 is fixed. If Condition 1.2 holds at qS = qWO and C = 0,
and if the first order conditions for the SRO are monotonic in qs, then qSRO < qWO in
equilibrium.
Next, I compare standards chosen by the CO and SRO if they charge the same fee C.
Proposition 1.5 Assume C is fixed. If and only if Condition 1.1 holds, the SRO chooses
higher quality standards than the CO.
22Note that the ability to fully extract the marginal increase does not imply the ability to extract all the
surplus. It may happen that the SRO is able to extract a small portion of the surplus for very low levels of
quality, but that this portion increases as the quality increases. Thus, it is even theoretically possible that the
SRO is able to extract more than the marginal increment in the surplus.
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This result does not allow us to compare standards chosen for different fees.23 However, it
is valid for all fees C, not necessarily the optimal or zero one. The proof of this result is based
on the following intuition. The certifier chooses standards so that the change in costs and
prices are equal to each other for the marginal producers (to maximize participation). This
is suboptimal for self-regulation, because other participating producers face lower marginal
costs than the marginal change in price (and revenues). Thus, the SRO chooses quality so that
the marginal costs for the marginal producer are higher than the marginal revenue. Under
the condition from this proposition, this happens only when standards are higher than those
chosen by the CO.
Also, one can combine the previous results to compare standards chosen by the CO and
welfare optimal standards.
Proposition 1.6 Let’s assume that the welfare function has only one optimum in the relevant
range.24 If Condition 1.2 holds, then the CO chooses lower standards than is welfare optimal
for an exogenously given fee C.
The result is similar to Proposition 1.4. It shows that the ability of the CO to extract
rent determines the quality standards. Combining results from Propositions 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6
gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1.1 If Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 hold for a given C, the standards satisfy
qWO(C) > qSRO(C) > qCO(C).
Finally, I show that a comparison of standards for different fees is not possible.
Proposition 1.7 In equilibrium, standards chosen by a self-regulatory organization can be
higher or lower than those chosen by a certifying organization.
In the appendix, I present two examples that differ in the production costs only. In one
case, the SRO chooses a higher standard than the CO, while the opposite is true in the other
example. Thus, it is not possible to make a comparison of standards for different fees.
1.3.5 Extension—not-for-profit certifiers
Next, I extend the analysis by considering the behavior of not-for-profit certifiers. I focus on
the maximization of revenue, standards and the number of certified firms.
23The comparison of standards for different fees is not possible because it is not clear what effect a change in
fee C will have on the standards chosen by the SRO. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, one can show that
such an effect is non-linear and its sign cannot be determined without significantly restrictive assumptions.
In the appendix, I show that it is possible, at C = 0, for the SRO to choose higher and lower standards than
the standards chosen by the CO at the fee of its choice.
24This range is [min{qCO(C), qWO(C)}, max{qCO(C), qWO(C)}],where qWO(C) is a welfare optimal stan-
dards for an exogenously given fee C > 0. This condition is satisfied if, for example, the welfare function is
differentiable and single peaked.
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Revenue maximization
Let’s assume that the certifier maximizes the total revenue of the certified producers. Since
producing quality is costly, this is not equivalent to the total profit-maximization of the SRO.





(p(C, qS)) f(α)dα = max
C,qS
F (α∗(C, qS)) p(C, qS).
Proposition 1.8 The producer-revenue-maximizing certifier will choose higher standards than
the profit-maximizing certifier for any given C if and only if Condition 1.1 holds.
In contrast to the profit-maximizing certifier, the producers’ revenue maximization CO
thus chooses higher standards for any given C.
Maximization of the number of certified producers





It is easy to show that because increasing fee C reduces participation for given standards
(Lemma 1.1), the CO maximizing the number of certified producers will choose zero fee. I
compare the standards it will choose with the SRO that also prefers fee C = 0.
Proposition 1.9 The optimal standards are lower than those chosen by the SRO if and only
if Condition 1.1 holds.
Note that the standards chosen by a certifier that maximizes the number of certified
producers and its own profit are the same for fixed fee C. Their behavior differs in the choice
of fees, not standards.
Standards maximization
Let’s assume that the CO maximizes the standards, subject to participation constraints.
Intuitively, zero market size is to be expected. On such a market, consumers of the highest
valuation (β = 0) trade with producers with the lowest production costs (α = 0). Obviously,
the fee C is set to zero. Neither consumers nor producers have a positive surplus—the price
corresponds to the production costs, which corresponds to the valuation of the good. The
maximal price as a function of quality is implicitly defined by the equation
U(0,M − pmax, qmax) = U(0,M, 0).
The lowest price that a producer of the lowest costs is willing to accept for a good of quality
qmax is
p = g(qmax, 0).
The maximal quality that can be produced on the market is
U(0,M − g(qmax, 0), qmax) = U(0,M, 0).
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Note that this problem may have an unbounded solution. For example, if Uq > 0 and
g(q, 0) = gq(q, 0) = 0, the highest possible standards are infinite.25 Obviously, this is a
degenerate case that does not require further study.
1.3.6 Extension 2—costly testing technology
So far, I have assumed that both CO and SRO possess costless and perfect testing technology.
In this section I analyze the situation in which the costs of certification and self-regulation are
positive. I do not assume that the costs differ between the CO and SRO, even though this is
certainly possible. I postpone the discussion of the difference in the cost to the last section.
I do not intend to show that certification is cheaper than self-regulation (or vice-versa).
Instead, I study how costs influence the choice of fee and standards analyzed in the previous
section. For simplicity, I study only for-profit certification and total-profit maximization self-
regulation. It is obvious that purely fixed costs would not affect the decision of the CO, who
needs to cover them to remain in the market. It would, however, force the SRO to charge a
positive fee. Depending on the size of these costs, the SRO will behave somewhat similarly
to the CO. If these fixed costs are as large as the potential profit of the profit-maximizing
CO, the SRO would have to behave exactly as the CO—it is not possible to extract the same
amount from the producers in another, for them preferred, way.26
However, it is not possible to analyze the general cost function. Instead, I focus on
constant marginal cost technology—each test costs δ > 0.
Total-profit-maximizing SRO






(p(C, qS)− g(qS , α)− C) f(α)dα− δF (α∗(C, qS)), qS).












Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.3 show that the SRO operates in the range of standards where an
additional increase in standards leads to lower participation. In the case of positive constant
marginal costs, the SRO benefits more from increasing the standard because it will have to
certify less producers. Thus, these costs increase the standards chosen by the SRO.
Profit-maximizing CO
The objective function of the profit-maximizing CO facing positive marginal costs δ is
max
C,qS
(C − δ)F (α∗(qS , C)).
25Note that these assumptions require g(0, 0) = gq(0, 0) = 0, but do not specify gq(q, 0) or g(q, 0) for q > 0.
26If there was such possibility, the CO would be able to achieve higher profits.
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The first order conditions are








One can see that the decision about qS did not change. Compared to the costless technology
case,




The second term in the first FOC is negative but smaller than before (C− δ), ceteris paribus.
This implies a necessary reduction in the number of applicants F (α∗(C, qS)). Since the quality
decision did not change, the reduction in participants comes only from an increase in fees C.
This result is not surprising in light of our previous conclusions. The CO always chooses
standards so that the number of applying producers is maximized for a given fee C. Since the
testing gets more expensive, the CO wants to reduce the number of applicants. The optimal
way to do so is by increasing fees. This nicely contrasts with the SRO that does not increase
the fees, but increases quality standards, which reduces the number of producers applying for
membership.
Under fixed costs, the SRO has to charge a positive fee to cover these costs, but it chooses
to charge the lowest fee possible. Fixed costs thus motivates the SRO to increase its size
and this can be done only via reduced standards. Obviously, these two effects have opposite
directions.
1.4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, I present a unified model of certification and self-regulation and analyze its
properties in order to compare the behavior of self-regulatory organizations and certifying
organizations. The ability to extract marginal rents from consumers determines whether the
standards of the SRO will be optimal or not. Because the welfare optimal fee is zero, the
behavior of the profit-maximizing CO is never welfare optimal. I also study conditions under
which the SRO is forced to charge a positive fee, C > 0. If the marginal production costs gqS
are increasing in quality q more than the (relative) marginal consumer valuation UqSUM , then
the SRO chooses higher quality standards. Finally, I show that under mild conditions on the
welfare function, the CO will choose lower quality standards than would be welfare optimal
even for any exogenously given fee C > 0.
All these quality comparisons are possible only under the assumption that the fees are
the same. Therefore, they do not let us to compare standards actually chosen by the SRO
(C = 0) and CO (C > 0). However, I show that the SRO may choose higher or lower quality
than the CO, using two simple examples. Because the impact of an exogenously given fee on
standards chosen by the SRO is ambiguous, it is not possible to identify the precise conditions
that would determine whether the SRO will choose higher or lower standards in a general
setting.
I also study the form of the regulation of the SRO. If the SRO is allowed to impose both
quality standards and limit the number of its participants, it will choose lower quality stan-
dards than the SRO that can use only quality as a restriction of entry. This is a generalization
of Shaked and Sutton (1981).
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I also discuss the impact of the objective function of a certifier on the quality and fee
chosen. I have shown that if Condition 1.2 holds, a CO that maximizes the revenue of
producers will choose higher standards than the (its own) profit-maximizing CO. Moreover,
the CO that maximizes the number of certified organizations chooses zero fee C and lower
standards than the SRO, if Condition 1.1 holds. The standard-maximizing CO leads to a
corner solution—one unit of good traded, and zero profit and consumer surplus.
Finally, I analyze the case of costly testing technology. If there are positive constant
marginal costs, the SRO chooses higher standards, while the CO increases the fee but does
not change standards.
Thus, this model provides some evidence that the SRO may often be more favorable rel-
ative to profit-maximizing certification. When the testing technology is perfect, it chooses
lower fees and if it is able to fully extract marginal change in consumer surplus when standards
change, it chooses optimal standards. Not-for-profit certification may be a more suitable alter-
native to self-regulation than a for-profit one. A certifier maximizing the number of certified
producers is likely to choose lower standards but will choose an optimal fee. The certifier who
maximizes producers’ revenue will (under mild conditions) choose higher standards than the
for-profit certifier, but will choose positive fees.
This modeling approach has several limitations. I assume perfect testing technology for
the CO and SRO. This assumption significantly simplifies the analysis because it allows us
to focus on one level of quality—a standard. I can abstract from the game between the SRO
(who tries to establish a quality that benefits everybody) and its members (who would prefer
if only others produce high quality).
It is clear that perfect detection technology does not in fact exist. Since mistakes happen,
firms for whom it is cheap to produce high quality goods might prefer to over-invest to reduce
the probability of an unfavorable error, while firms with high costs for producing quality
goods might be willing to take some risks and under-invest in quality. This analysis does not
allow us to capture these effects.
If the testing technology is imperfect, the mechanism of certification (De and Nabar, 1991)
and self-regulation (Nunez 2001, 2007) work less efficiently. Some producers may be able to
pass the test despite the fact that they do not meet the required standards. This has an
impact on the quality expectations of consumers and thus the prices of the products and
on other producers. Results by Nunez (2001,2007) seem to suggest that this impact may be
particularly strong in the case of self-regulation. In such a case, this analysis is biased in favor
of self-regulation. While relaxing the assumption of perfect testing technology does not seem
possible due to the complexity of the resulting model, it may be possible to remove the bias by
assuming more expensive testing technology for the SRO. For example, such an assumption
may be justified by more expensive negotiations between various members of the SRO or by
the need for higher payments to the management of the SRO to enforce the standards. Then,
these results that seem to favor self-regulation may no longer be valid, depending on these
additional costs for the SRO.
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1.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Using the defining equations of p∗(C, qS), α∗(C, qS), β∗(C, qS),








F3 : U(β∗(C, qS),M − p∗(C, qS), qS)− U(β∗(C, qS),M, 0) = 0,
I compute the matrix of first derivatives and use it to do comparative statics using the Implicit
Function Theorem:  1 −gα(q, α) 00 −f(α∗) w(β∗)
−UM 0 UB
 .
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−f(α∗)Uβ + UMgα(q, α)w(β∗)
< 0.
Note that
Uβ < 0, UM > 0, gα > 0, w(β∗) > 0, f(α∗) =⇒




















= (gqS (qS , α), 0,−UqS )
′ .
Our assumptions are
gqS (qS , α) > 0, f(α
∗) > 0, w(β∗) > 0, Uβ < 0, UM > 0, Uq > 0,




gqS (qS , α)f(α
∗)Uβ − UqSgα(q, α)w(β∗)
−f(α∗)Uβ + UMgα(q, α)w(β∗)
> 0
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∂α
∂qS
= − UMgqS (qS , α)− UqS
− f(α
∗)




∗)gqS (qS , α)− UqSf(α∗)
−f(α∗)Uβ + UMgα(q, α)w(β∗)
.
The sign of ∂α∂qS and
∂β
∂qS
depend on the relative size of gqS and
Uq
UM
. If the increase in costs
of the marginal firm due to an increase in standards is bigger than the relative benefit to the
consumers UqUM , the size of the market decreases.




Using the derivations from the proof of Lemma 1.1, such a condition requires
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−f(α∗)Uβ + UMgα(q, α)w(β∗)
one can obtain ∂β∂qS = 0.






















f(α∗(C, qS))C = 0.
The second of these conditions is positive if
























which happens if and only if






Proof of Lemma 1.4. Assume the existence of an interior solution qS such that the first
order condition holds. Using a contradiction, if gqS (qS , α










= F (α∗(C, qS))
∂g(qS , α∗(C, qS))
∂qS




∂g(qS , α∗(C, qS))
∂qS
.









gqS (qS , α
∗(C, qS))f(α∗)Uβ − Uqgα(qS , α∗(C, qS))w(β∗)
−f(α∗)Uβ + UMgα(qS , α∗(C, qS))w(β∗)
,
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Assume that the fee C > 0 is fixed. The optimal quality









in the case in which the SRO can regulate only quality. If the SRO is able to enforce a











f(α∗(C, qS))C = 0.
I have already established that

















at quality qnS . Since the equality holds at q
q
S (regulation of quality only) and the first order




Thus, the ability to control the number of members reduces quality standards.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2. The maximization problem
W = CF (α∗(C, qS)) +
∫ ∞
p∗(C,qS)




(p∗(C, qS)− C − g(qS , α)) f(α)dα
has two FOC, one with respect to fee C and the other with respect to standards qS .


































p∗(C, qS)− C − g(qS , α∗(C, qS)) = 0
F (α∗(C, qS)) = W (β∗(C, qS)),













which leads back to C = 0. The other first order condition is




















W (β∗(C, qS)) = 0.
Under C = 0, this condition becomes












This condition is rather intuitive. The standards are set optimally when the change in the
production costs due to an increase in standards equals the change in gross consumer sur-
plus.28
27Note that the marginal firm has zero profit.
28“Gross consumer surplus” means the surplus change when prices are constant. The “net” consumer surplus
then denotes the surplus minus the expenditures.
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By comparing these two conditions, one can see that the SRO chooses the welfare optimal









Similar results hold in the case in which fee C is exogenously set to a positive level.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Let us denote




















































Thus, G(qWO) < 0. If G(qS) is decreasing, then qSRO < qWO because G(qSRO) = 0 by
definition. Note that the proof for C > 0 would be more complicated because the government
takes into account the impact of the standards on revenues from the SRO, while the SRO
does not.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. In equilibrium the SRO chooses standards qSRO such that
gqS (qS , α
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while the CO chooses standards qCO such that
gqS (qS , α




If C is fixed, then both left and right hand sides are functions of qS only. If the function




is increasing in qS , then
G(qCO) = 0, G′(qSRO) > 0 =⇒ qSRO > qCO.
Note that one must consider the total derivative of gqs and
Uq
UM
because of the indirect effect
that qS has on prices p∗ and participation α∗, β∗.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. For a positive fee, the welfare optimum is defined as



































I evaluate the first order condition of the welfare optimality at qCO. Since ∂α
∗
∂qS




























Using the monotonicity of welfare, one can conclude that the value of qCO is smaller than
welfare optimal qWO.
Example 1.1 (and proof of Proposition 1.7) In equilibrium, standards chosen by a self-
regulatory organization at fee C = 0 may be higher or lower than those chosen by a certi-
fying organization at C∗, depending on the parametrization. I will provide two examples of
parametrization that lead to opposite outcomes. First, I show that it may happen that the
SRO chooses lower quality than the CO.
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Assuming the following parametrization: g(q, α) = q2+qα+α, f(α) = w(β) = 1, U(β, q, M) =
(1−β)q +M − p, one can easily show that the optimal standard for the SRO is qSRO = 0.41
for zero fee C = 0. The CO chooses standards qCO = 0.43 and charges a fee for certification
C = 0.123.
The second example uses the following parametrization: g(q, α) = q3α, f(α) = w(β) =
1, U(β, q, M) = (1− β)q + M − p. In such a situation, the SRO chooses standard qSRO =
√
3.
The CO chooses standard qCOS = 1, which is lower than the standard chosen by the SRO.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. First order conditions are
[C] : f (α∗(C, qS))
∂α∗(C, qS)
∂C




[qS ] : f (α∗(C, qS))
∂α∗(C, qS)
∂qS




Note that for the second condition to be satisfied, the signs of ∂α
∗(C,qS)
∂qS
and ∂p(C,qS)∂qS have to




This happens only if





For the rest of the proof, see the proof of Proposition 1.5 comparing standards chosen by the
SRO and CO for a given fee.












and results from Lemma 1.1 ∂α
∗(C,qS)
∂C < 0 show that to maximize the number of certified





it is easy to show that the optimal standards are lower than those chosen by the SRO if and
only if







For the detailed proof, see Proposition 1.5, a comparison of standards chosen by the SRO and
CO.
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Chapter 2
Fair Trade—Is It Really Fair?
Joint work with Tomáš Konečný
Abstract:
One of the arguments against the Fair Trade scheme is that the guaranteed minimum
price tends to depress world prices and thus the incomes of non-participating farmers (e.g.
The Economist, 2006). We develop a model that distinguishes between the impact of the in-
troduction of a Fair Trade market per se and the effect of minimum price policies given that
a Fair Trade market actually exists. The model suggests that the claims against Fair Trade
might not be correct. The introduction of a Fair Trade market reduces information asymme-
tries between the trading parties and dampens the market power of middlemen. Improved
matching and lower margins of the middlemen have the capacity to increase the incomes of
both participating and non-participating farmers. The minimum contracting price as part of
Fair Trade standards, however, precludes the full realization of the program’s potential ben-
efits by reducing farmers’ payoffs relative to the free-contracting alternative. The minimum
price also paradoxically increases the profits of the middlemen whose local monopsony power
the Fair Trade scheme originally aimed to retrench. Furthermore, the total surplus generated
by Fair Trade cooperatives declines, which translates into reduced investment resources avail-
able for the community. From a policy perspective, measures to reduce excess supply such
as relaxed-price setting over a stipulated time period or gradual replacement of participating
cooperatives by new applicants could provide superior alternatives.
Keywords: Certification, regulation, price setting, coffee, Fair Trade, monopsony
JEL classification: D18, D21, D43, D45, D71, J51, Q17, Q56
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2.1 Introduction
As Fair Trade-certified products gradually move from specialized shops to supermarket shelves,
the actual impact and potential of Fair Trade has become an increasingly discussed topic. Aca-
demics, journalists and policymakers as well as NGOs and other stakeholders involved in the
Fair Trade scheme present their worries and expectations regarding the movement’s actual
capacity to improve the livelihoods of poor people. Besides the common assertion that Fair
Trade certification helps marginalized producers through guaranteed minimum prices and
other provisions like access to pre-finance or market information (FLO, 2007), the most vocal
concerns of Fair Trade opponents relate to the excess Fair Trade supply, the impact on non-
participating producers, and the uncertain nature of Fair Trade demand (The Economist,
2006;Washington Post, 2005; Weber, 2007).1 These opinions certainly deserve a more de-
tailed analysis as the potential reach of Fair Trade extends to millions of households living in
poverty.
This paper aims to address some of the most frequently expressed concerns relating to the
Fair Trade certification scheme, namely the excess of Fair Trade supply due to the guaranteed
minimum price, the impact on non-participating producers, and the limited scope of Fair
Trade demand. In particular, it aims to answer the following questions: What is the impact
of the introduction of Fair Trade markets on farmers’ incomes? Does the guaranteed Fair
Trade price disadvantage those producers who do not engage in Fair Trade compared with
those who do? How do the costs and benefits of the scheme depend on the structure of global
markets?
We develop a simple framework incorporating the empirical regularities of the largest and
most successful Fair Trade market—coffee. Within this framework we distinguish between
the impact of the introduction of a market with Fair Trade-certified products2 and the effect
of minimum price policies given that a Fair Trade market actually exists. Furthermore, we
study the link between the two above-mentioned measures and the behavior of middlemen
operating in regional coffee markets.
The following section provides a brief exposé of the structural changes on the global
coffee market in the 90s and the success of Fair Trade-labelled coffee. Section 3 reviews
the organization of the Fair Trade labelling scheme and the major arguments favoring the
Fair Trade idea. Section 4 develops a model that addresses some of the benefits and concerns
relating to Fair Trade in a simple framework first without monopsonistic middlemen and then
with the middlemen that control access to world markets. For ease of exposition, Section 4
also contains the numerical results obtained from explicit supply and demand structures. The
final section concludes.
1There are, of course, additional arguments against Fair Trade such as the inefficiencies in processing and
distribution due to Fair Trade’s bypassing of specialized intermediaries exploiting economies of scale. Fair
Trade has also been criticised as yet another instrument for price discrimination across customers. For the
sake of clarity, our paper does not address these issues and instead focuses exclusively on the excess supply
argument and the corresponding impact on farmers.
2The assumption that there indeed exists a demand for such products can be justified by Andreoni (1990)’s
”warm glow” effect. In the present context, the ”warm glow” effect reflects the additional utility due to the
consumption of coffee grown under ”fair” standards.
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2.2 Fair Trade and the global coffee market
The Fair Trade idea is usually associated with coffee, the most successful Fair Trade com-
modity with the largest share in total sales and the longest history among traded Fair Trade
commodities.3 The growth of Fair Trade can be neatly illustrated by the story of this com-
modity. The yearly average increase in total sales volume of Fair Trade coffee over the period
2001-2006 amounted to 27%, with growth rates increasing on a yearly basis and reaching as
much as 53% in 2006 (FLO, 2007). The extraordinary growth can be attributed mostly to the
expanding market in the United States, where only in 2006 sales volume more than doubled.
Nonetheless, in Europe with its 79,000 sales points, the market share of Fair Trade coffee has
been likewise increasing substantially. In the United Kingdom, the market share of ground
Fair Trade coffee increased from 1.5% in 1999 to 20% in 2004 (FINE, 2005).4 While in other
European countries the growth rates and market shares have been more modest, they still
exceed the annual growth of world coffee demand (0.4%) by an order of magnitude. Hence,
despite a still negligible share in the overall world coffee consumption (0.8% out of a total
6.7 million tons in 2006; FLO, 2007 and ICO, 2007),5 the continuing expansion of specialty
markets and rising consumer awareness of the Fair Trade concept6 call for a closer evaluation
of the respective pros and cons. We begin with developments on the world coffee markets
over the last few decades.
2.2.1 Coffee crisis in the 90s
Until 1989, the global coffee market was regulated through the International Coffee Agreement
(ICA), a set of agreements that stipulated production quotas and governed quality standards
for the majority of produced coffee. The disintegration of the ICA and the following sharp
rise in coffee supply coincided with stagnating demand and the market concentration of major
roasting and trading companies. On the supply side, the quota abolition led to the output
expansion of existing producers (e.g., Brazil), as well as the entry of new significant players
(Vietnam) specializing in the production of lower quality Robusta coffee. The demand side, on
the other hand, witnessed improved processing technologies that removed the bitter taste of
cheaper coffee beans such as Robusta and “natural” Arabica. These advances shifted roasters’
demand away from traditional coffee exporters from Central America specializing in a more
expensive mild Arabica (Lindsey, 2003).7 The coffee glut has been further exacerbated by
the long adjustment lags typical for coffee production.8
Except for short periods of recovery in the mid-90s, coffee prices reached historical lows
3In North America, coffee accounted for 34% of all Fair Trade sales in 2003 (EFTA, 1998). According to
the European Commission (1999), the estimated share of Fair Trade food products totaled 60% of the overall
Fair Trade retail turnover within the EU. Coffee made up approximately 50% of the above-mentioned share.
4Note that the figures refer to ground coffee, for instant coffee the shares are much lower (FLO, 2007).
5According to the FLO (2007), the worldwide certified sales of all Fair Trade products amounted to roughly
2.3bln USD. The overall sum would be slightly higher given that the figure does not include non-certified
Fair Trade articles. Given this minor share, one could argue that the cross-price effects impacting the non-
participating farmers are likely to be rather tame, if any. In Section 4 we argue that this might not be the
case.
6Moore (2004) cites survey evidence on the expanding share of FT consumers describing themselves as
“ethical”, or “strongly ethical”.
7According to Wasserman (2002), cited in Lindsey (2003), the estimated percentage of mild Arabica in the
roasters’ leading coffee blends dropped from 50% in 1989 to 35% in 2001.
8It takes several years before beans can be first harvested.
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and led to substantial hardship in the affected rural economies.9 In October 2001, the price
of higher quality Arabica coffee10 quoted at the New York Board of Trade reached its lowest
level in 30 years at 45 cents/lb. For the sake of comparison, Bacon (2005) puts the esti-
mated average monetary production costs of small farm producers to vary between 49 and
79 cents/lb. Nonetheless, since 2001 the price of Arabica coffee has gradually risen so that in
October 2007 it has surpassed the Fair Trade minimum price 121 cents/lb.
2.2.2 Growth of specialty markets
While demand for normal “bulk” coffee has been stagnating and its prices have been falling,
the specialty coffee sector has been growing fast. For example, the U.S. gourmet coffee
market in 2001 represented 40% of the total market value and 17% by volume with annual
growth rates well above 5% (Giovanucci, 2001). The continuing success of specialty brands
has reflected increasing consumer demand for high quality, taste and an attractive “story”
behind each cup of coffee. The Fair Trade and organic labels were able to keep up with
these market differentiation trends and although they represent still a relatively minor share
in the specialty coffee sector (3-5% in the U.S. specialty coffee retail market (Giovanucci,
2001)), their position becomes stronger each year. Apart from increasing market shares
in the gourmet sector, the growing importance of Fair Trade in the coffee market becomes
apparent from both its increasing recognition by customers and widening presence in common
distribution channels. The former can be illustrated by survey evidence according to which
74% of the French population understood the notion of Fair Trade and 50% of the adult
population in the UK recognized the Fair Trade label (FINE, 2005). Fair Trade products
have also become increasingly available in “mainstream” retail outlets. In Europe only, the
number of supermarkets with a Fair Trade selection increased from 43,100 in 1999 to 56,700
in 2004 (FINE, 2005), i.e., by 32%. The origins, organization and working of Fair Trade
networks facilitating the above-mentioned market progress is described in more detail in the
following section.
2.3 The origins, organization and benefits of Fair Trade
The Fair Trade movement can be traced back more than 40 years when Alternative Trade
Organizations (ATO) established trade networks connecting marginalized producers in devel-
oping countries with socially aware customers in developed markets. In 1997 several indepen-
dent labelling initiatives formed Fairtrade Labelling Organization International (FLO). Five
years later FLO launched the FairTrade label in order to harmonize different labels used at
the time.
The organization currently works with 569 Fair Trade-certified producer organizations
representing over 1.4 million farmers and workers in 57 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin
America (FLO, 2007). Similar to other Fair Trade initiatives, the FLO supports Fair Trade
9Bacon (2005) mentions substantial rural-urban migration in Matagalpa, Nicaragua and eroded farmlands
following the substitution from coffee to cattle pasture in Coto Brus, Costa Rica. Similar observations from
other regions can be found in e.g. Raynolds (2002a) or Ronchi (2002).
10Arabica and Robusta are the two main coffee species produced. While Arabica is grown mostly in Latin
America and Eastern Africa, major producers of Robusta coffee are located in Brazil, Uganda, India and
South-East Asian countries (ICO, 2007).
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through the linking of producers with traders in order to match supply and demand, liai-
son with producer organizations to strengthen their production and export capacities, and
lobbying at international forums on trade and development. Nonetheless, the main task of
the FLO is the standard setting, certification and monitoring of the Fair Trade Certification
Trademark recipients.
2.3.1 Fair Trade and labelling
Of course, coffee is not the only Fair Trade article and not all Fair Trade products are certified.
According to FLO data, the retail value of all Fair Trade products sold in 14 European
countries in 2005 totaled e657m at minimum, out of which e597m (i.e., approximately 90%)
came from the sales of certified products. The labelling scheme covers almost exclusively
food products. Besides coffee as a leading and most successful commodity, the Fair Trade
certification portfolio covers a number of other major crops including bananas, cocoa and rice.
The certification standards vary by commodity and production process (small-scale farming
vs. production by hired labor) and distinguish between producers and traders.
In the case of coffee, traders have to trade directly with Fair Trade producers and:
1. pay at least a guaranteed minimum price (121 cents/lb for Arabica coffee) or above to
cover the costs of sustainable production. In case the coffee price quoted at the New
York Board of Trade exceeds the Fair Trade Minimum Price, the Fair Trade price equals
the New York price,
2. pay the Fair Trade premium 10 cents that should be used by producers for community
development or investment by individual producers,
3. offer pre-financing/liquidity up to 60% of the contract value,
4. sign contracts that promote long-term sustainable planning.
Fair Trade coffee producers, on the other hand, have to
1. be small-scale farmers associated in a democratic organization,
2. have the necessary export capacity,
3. pursue environmentally friendly production techniques (FLO, 2007).
The most visible Fair Trade benefit to the participating farmers seems to be the Fair
Trade Minimum Price. Shocks and long adjustment lags of inelastic supply and demand in
the global coffee market directly translate into price fluctuations, which can inflict significant
hardship on micro- and small-scale producers accounting for a significant part of the overall
coffee production structure (see e.g., Raynolds (2002a) or Moore (2004)).11 These producers
face limited opportunities to cope with adverse market developments especially in periods of
prolonged low prices.
However, the availability of the minimum Fair Trade price during times of coffee gluts
and low market prices might result in excess supply that forces FT farmers to sell part of
11In Central America, approximately 85% or 250,000 farms are micro- and small-scale (CEPAL, 2002 cited
in Bacon, 2005 ).
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their production via traditional channels. Depending on the relative prices and costs of their
production on FT and regular markets, it is possible that the excess supply regime brings
losses to some of the farmers. In Section 4, we develop a model that allows us to study these
effects.
2.3.2 Other benefits of Fair Trade
The minimum Fair Trade price is not the only benefit to the participating farmers. The
interviewed farmers often mention the advantages of stability rather than the actual level of
the price.
An even more important dimension of Fair Trade, however, seems to be the access to
developed markets as well as the expert assistance from Fair Trade organizations aimed to
improve farmers’ position on the market. Fair Trade cooperatives often perceive the scheme as
an opportunity to learn about current demand trends and quality expectations by customers.
Relationships between the cooperatives and ATOs usually exceed the notion of a common
market transaction and can include joint investments or the development of marketing strate-
gies for the developed market. Raynolds (2002b, p. 419) claims that
in many cases the technical expertise and market information provided through
Fair Trade may be more important for producer associations than the financial
and commodity arrangements. . . This information is critical for those selling their
coffee via conventional channels or seeking organic specification.
In addition, many producers (Raynolds (2002a), FLO (2007)) stated the elimination of
middlemen and farmers’ direct Fair Trade experience markedly improved their bargaining
position vis-à-vis other market agents and official authorities.
2.4 Model
While the farmers’ narratives consistently report higher or at least stable incomes and im-
proved living conditions due to the guaranteed Fair Trade price, the question still remains
how the very existence of Fair Trade, the minimum price and other dimensions of the scheme
impact upon non-participating producers. Fair Trade has been sometimes called a mecha-
nism creating an excess supply of coffee, which ultimately hurts the non-participating farmers
through a lower equilibrium price on the global market (The Economist, 2006). In this section
we argue that regardless of the degree of competition on local coffee markets, the introduc-
tion of a Fair Trade market per se leads to an improvement or at worst a preservation of all
farmers’ incomes unless the total realized demand for both types of coffee decreases in a new
equilibrium.12 In this respect, what many critics seem to address is not the actual existence
of a market with Fair Trade-certified products but the effect of a guaranteed rather than
market-determined Fair Trade price. This, together with Fair Trade’s impact on middlemen’s
behavior and profits, is also a major focus of our study.
In this section we develop a model that allows for several transmission channels that
might impinge on both participating and non-participating farmers. The model addresses
12The question how the demand for coffee changes when a FT market is introduced is primarily a question
about consumer preferences. Since we could argue for an increase or decrease in demand, we leave this question
open.
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the following questions: What is the impact of the introduction of Fair Trade markets on
farmers’ incomes? Does the guaranteed Fair Trade price disadvantage those producers who
do not engage in Fair Trade compared with those who do? How do the costs and benefits of
the scheme depend on the structure of the markets?
For the sake of simplicity, we divide the exposition into two subsections. The opening sub-
section assumes the absence of middlemen with monopsonistic positions vis-à-vis the farmers.
The basic setup presents a world describing two coexisting, perfectly competitive markets
(one for conventional coffee, the other for Fair Trade coffee) supplied by farmers from regions.
We first compare the two-market outcomes to the case with a single market for normal coffee
and then examine the impact of the Fair Trade price set above its market-clearing level.
In the second part, we extend this framework by assuming market failure in the distribu-
tion chain. In this setup, the middlemen control access to consumers, purchase normal coffee
from regional farmers and then deliver their product to the global market. Note that while
the world without middlemen described in the opening subsection is a useful benchmark, it
is not the existing structure of the coffee market. Our analysis thus allows us to compare the
impact of the Fair Trade mechanism in markets that do have powerful middlemen with those
that don’t. It also allows us to predict what would happen if the role of middlemen were
somehow eliminated. Would FT continue to operate if middlemen were absent?
2.4.1 Fair Trade in a world without middlemen
We assume there is a measure one of regions producing coffee and three types of economic
agents: farmers producing coffee, consumers and the Fair Trade Organization (FTO). The
FTO sets up a new market and decides on the contracting price pF at which the exchange
will occur. The FTO does not engage in actual Fair Trade transactions and instead focuses
purely on the institutional support of Fair Trade exchange. Assume each farmer decides
between investment into the production of 1 unit of coffee or an outside option normalized to
zero.13 Given that the farmer opted for coffee production, she can sell the harvested coffee
on the world market with normal coffee and get p, or to the Fair Trade market at price pF .
In each region there is a measure one of farmers with heterogeneous production costs c and
compliance costs f .14 The production costs c follow a general distribution function with c.d.f.
G (c) defined over support 〈0, 1〉. All farmers can also enter the Fair Trade market, yet the
cost of doing so for each farmer is f . We assume the following timing:15
1. The FTO sets up the FT market and sets the price pF .
2. Farmers choose between no production (outside option), production of regular coffee,
and production of certified FT coffee.
3. Production and trading take place.
13The normalization has been adopted for the sake of simplicity. While farmers might well face positive
and possibly heterogeneous outside options, these can be absorbed by the production cost parameter c. The
parameter would then have to be rescaled and reinterpreted as net investment costs into coffee production.
14Given the absence of an intensive production margin, both types of farmers’ costs are in principle fixed.
We discuss their nature as well as the mutual relationship between c and f later in this section.
15We focus on subgame perfect equilibria, in which all players correctly expect those variables that are
determined later in the game. For example, farmers correctly expect the price of coffee on the world market,
p.
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The case for heterogeneity in production cost c is rather straightforward. Farmers’ edu-
cation, experience, family size, equipment and soil fertility generally differ, which translates
into corresponding differences in farm cost levels.
The relationship between production costs c and compliance costs f is less clear and de-
rives directly from the nature of certification standards determined by the FLO. We argue that
these costs are negatively correlated with farmers’ productivity. To start with, the farmers
willing to produce and sell under the FLO label have to be organized into cooperatives, keep
records of all income and expenses and follow a number of other FLO monitoring guidelines.
It seems quite reasonable to assume that the compliance with this kind of costs will be easier
for more productive farmers whose lead in productivity presumably links to their superior
management skills and expertise. The FLO’s standards also include progress requirements
in terms of growth or volume, again favoring those with higher productivity. Our empha-
sis on intangible skills such as know-how and management capacity rather than production
technologies in a traditional “narrow” sense likewise conforms to the anecdotal evidence. For
example, Raynolds (2002b) mentions the case of a Mexican cooperative that succeeded in Fair
Trade largely through its years of experience in conventional markets. Similarly, Weber (2007)
reports the difficulties of younger, less experienced producer organizations with entering the
Fair Trade markets while Raynolds (2002a) emphasizes the necessary strong leadership and
capacity to innovate.
A fraction of compliance costs f can be attributed to the certification fees derived from
the FLO’s certification scheme. These take the form of a flat yearly fee paid to the FLO
to cover the costs of certification and expenses related to on-site inspections. Note that the
certification fee applies to the whole cooperative and thus introduces an incentive to expand
in order to reduce the per-capita certification cost. Since the incentives at the cooperative
level lie outside the primary focus of our paper, we abstract from this issue and assume the
per capita certification fee to be fixed so that the positive correlation between production
costs c and overall compliance costs f will be preserved.
In addition to the positive correlation between the two types of costs, we assume that the
compliance costs are indivisible. That is, farmers cannot choose to incur only a part of the
compliance costs f , depending on the proportion of their harvest targeted to the Fair Trade
market. Given that the above-mentioned compliance costs relate largely to farm attributes
that are indivisible in nature, we believe our assumption to be a reasonable one.
As far as the other assumptions, the introduction of multiple regions reflects the fact
that coffee growing areas are typically spatially divided among private middlemen taking a
monopsonist or oligopsonist position with respect to local farmers. Arbitrage among regions
is in practice limited given the lack of information, poor infrastructure and natural barriers
in mountainous areas where many small-scale coffee producers live (see e.g. Ronchi, 2002).16
16The normalization of the number of regions to 1 has been used for ease of exposition. Note that this does
not impact the results. The interested reader may simply multiply demand functions by 1
n
(where n stands
for the number of regions) and proceed with the analysis. Similarly, one might argue that the distribution of
the Fair Trade production across regions is not symmetric. Allowing for a fraction of regions to be without
Fair Trade production (yet with the same assumed cost structure) would impact on the relative strength of
individual channels at work. The qualitative picture, however, would not change. Finally, one might argue
that the cost structure is not identical across regions. In such a case, the model might be given an alternative
interpretation, where the overall cost distribution across internally homogeneous regions follows c.d.f. G (c)
and a single middleman with sole access to world markets decides on the overall amount of purchases. The
assumption of the middleman being a price taker on world markets, however, would be rather difficult to
justify.
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We also do not allow for production adjustment at the intensive margin and instead assume a
fixed output per farmer. As Weber (2007) observes, FLO generally does not induce a higher
Fair Trade supply of presently participating farmers and instead re-channels the existing
production from conventional markets through the certification of additional applicants. Even
if this was not the case, however, the situation of farmers often does not permit a significant
expansion of output due to either the absence of key productive assets such as land or capital,
or the replacement of the former coffee growing areas by urban development (Ronchi,2002;
Winters et al., 2004). This fact has also been acknowledged by the European Fair Trade
Association, which stated that “given the parcels of land [the farmers] possess and the lack
of working capital and resources, [the expansion of output] is almost out of the question”
(EFTA, 1998 cited in Ronchi, 2002). Despite the suggestive evidence on its relatively low
relevance for farmers’ adjustment, the model can nonetheless allow for the intensive margin.
The impact of price changes on the numbers of active farmers would then be partly muted via
the accommodation of farm output, yet the middlemen’s incentives would remain the same,
since the middleman is primarily interested in the available quantity of coffee instead of the
number of farmers.
The farmers’ constraints
In our model, a farmer has three options. Given her expectations regarding the price of
regular coffee p, she can take an outside option of zero value (no production), or invest into
producing 1 unit of coffee production. Given her decision to invest, she can sell to the market
with normal coffee or pay for the FT standards at an additional cost f and sell on the FT
market. The participation constraints are
no production: p < c & πpF + (1− π) p− c < f










where π ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of FT production that a farmer is able to sell on the FT
market, or equivalently, a probability of being able to sell all of the production for a risk-
neutral farmer. The case of π = 1 corresponds to the situation with both markets clearing.
Rationing
If π < 1, the Fair Trade price pF is set above its market-clearing level. As a result, some
rationing of the sales of FT coffee has to take place.
The excess supply with π < 1 is a fairly justified assumption, both theoretically and
empirically. First, it is usual to see excess supply on a market in which the price is artificially
increased above its equilibrium value. Empirical studies confirm this expectation. According
to Bacon (2005), close to 70% of Fair Trade cooperatives’ production goes to conventional
coffee markets and this figure is attributed to low demand and high quality requirements.
The Costa Rican cooperatives examined by Ronchi (2002) sold a mere 49% of their coffee
production as Fair Trade. In 2002, the FLO had to temporarily reject pending applicants
due to the discrepancy between supply and demand. In the same year the FLO estimated
that the supply of Fair Trade coffee was seven times the total Fair Trade volume actually
exported (Weber, 2007). While there are other possible explanations why FT farmers might
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sell their coffee through conventional markets (e.g, liquidity problems during the harvest
season (Bacon, 2005)), in light of the above-mentioned evidence it seems that excess supply
plays an important role. In our model, the assumption of FT sales flowing partially through
conventional channels relies fully on the excess supply argument.
We assume a proportional rationing rule, ie. excess supply on the FT market makes
the participating farmers sell only part of their production through the Fair Trade channel,
the rest being directed back to markets with normal coffee. In the rational expectations
equilibrium, the expectations will have to coincide with the realized proportion of the total
FT output sold to FT customers.
While proportional rationing seems a natural choice, it is not the only possibility and
different rules may affect results significantly. For example, if the rationing is done according
to the costs of FT production, only farmers with low costs will find it optimal to apply for an
FT certificate. This follows from the rational expectations assumption: farmers with higher
costs who would be able to sell part of their production under the proportional rationing rule
but nothing under the rule based on the costs of production would prefer not to enter in the
first place to save on the fee and additional production costs f . This would imply that there
would not be any rationing taking place, since only farmers who expect to be able to sell on
the FT market will enter it. The impact of an increase in the FT price would thus depend
on the effect it has on the quantity of coffee traded. We assume that this effect is negative,
which would mean that if the FTO raises the FT price, it restricts the entry of farmers. This
does not need to happen under the rationing rule, because a higher price on the FT market
may attract more farmers despite a decrease in the probability of a successful trade, as we
show later in the numerical example. Since we do observe significant excess supply on the FT
market, we prefer the proportional rationing rule.
We make another assumption that might influence our results. We assume that consumers
do not care about the excess supply on the FT market. We are not aware of any evidence that
would suggest that consumers are aware of the existence of the excess supply or that they
change their behavior according to it. One might imagine that the consumers increase their
consumption of FT coffee in case of higher excess supply (due to a potentially more significant
“warm glow” effect). It is also possible that they would decrease their consumption, because
they feel that the organization of FT the market is wasteful and not beneficial to the farmers.
Since we use rather general demand functions, an explicit assumption about the consumers’
reaction to excess supply would seem arbitrary. However, it might be a interesting venue for
future research.
Production costs
The above-mentioned constraints define the potential combinations of c and f (as well as the
corresponding cut-off points) that are consistent with the particular participation choices of
the farmers. For simplicity, we will assume f = kc, where k ≤ 1 is a parameter.17 Figure 2.1
17Our specific assumption of the linear relationship between production costs c and compliance costs f
satisfies the assumption of a positive correlation between c and f and greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis.
We might further allow for a part of compliance costs to reflect the fixed per-capita certification fee discussed
in this section, so that f = a + kc, a > 0. Nonetheless, the positive constant a does not add much to our
story (see the curve f = kc in Figure 2.1, which is in fact a special case of f = a + kc with a = 0). Also note
that independent of the production costs c and given the coffee prices p and pF , if k = 0 and f = a, all active
farmers would be willing to participate either exclusively in the Fair Trade or the normal market. The price
mechanism would then have to adjust so that ultimately the farmers are indifferent between the two choices.
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Figure 2.1: Farmers’ decisions for various cost combinations (f, c).
illustrates the participation constraints and the respective supplies for normal and FT coffee
generated by the line f = kc with k = 1 and c distributed uniformly over 〈0, 1〉.
Objective function of the Fair Trade Organization
The Fair Trade Organization is a non-profit institution that claims to aim to improve the
living conditions of farmers. It is not clear how this broadly defined motivation translates
into a decision about the Fair Trade price and other requirements. Thus, instead of making an
explicit assumption about the objective function of the FTO, we study how different choices
of the Fair Trade price impacts farmers (both participating and non-participating). This
allows us to discuss which objective of the FTO is consistent with its current behavior and
which is not.
Hence some heterogeneity in f is needed for the model to become interesting. For the purpose of the testing
of our theory, one would need to estimate the value of the parameter k from the costs that FT farmers have
in addition to their similar non-FT counterparts. Such an estimation, however, goes beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Regardless of the objective function of the FTO, its role as a certification body is to
guarantee to the consumer that certain conditions (like price, pre-financing, etc.) for the
farmers are met. In this respect, the FT certification works like any other certification system.
The certifier, FTO, assures consumers about the properties of the good they purchase that
they cannot directly or easily observe. Thus, it solves the asymmetry of information problem
and facilitates the matching between farmers’ supply and consumer preferences. The FTO,
however, does not enter into direct transactions with either farmers or traders.
It is easy to find examples of for-profit certification systems but it seems that the for-
profit behavior of the FTO would go directly against what it tries to sell. Thus, we focus
on possible non-profit objectives instead. It is also important to note that the quality that
the certifier provides is not the taste of the coffee and thus Fair Trade complements rather
then substitutes vertical differentiation in this respect. Fair Trade certification, even though
it requires the sustainability of production processes, does not require that the products are
organic. In fact, one can often find both organic and Fair Trade certification of the same
coffee.
The equilibrium and comparative statics
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sumptions impose reasonable restrictions—the direct price effect is negative and the indirect
price effect is positive but smaller in absolute value than the direct effect.
Note that given the minor share of Fair Trade in world coffee consumption (see Section
2), the cross-price effects impacting upon the non-participating farmers could arguably be
rather tame (if there are any). In practice, however, even world demand differentiates across
regions of origin. As a result, Fair Trade production in e.g. Nicaragua, where the share of
Fair Trade production is relatively high, might indeed affect the prices of Nicaraguan coffee.
We assume that Fair Trade is strong enough to shift world prices.19
We are interested in an equilibrium with both markets being active. If the price pF
becomes market-determined, participation and realized supplies coincide as farmers supply
either to the normal or FT coffee market and π = 1. In the excess supply setup with π < 1,
however, we need to distinguish between the local participation choices and the realized
supplies to global markets.
18Several studies such as Broda and Weinstein (2006), Petrin (2002), or Feenstra (1994) addressed the wel-
fare impact of the introduction of new goods/markets within the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework that
relies largely on CES utility functions and love-of-variety. In the present context of market creation through
environmental or socially conscious labelling, Podhorsky (2006) provides an extension of Melitz (2003)’s indus-
try model with heterogeneous firms where each firm produces a different variety and decides on the adoption
of an environmental label. For Fair Trade labelling, however, the goods in question are typically ex ante
homogeneous (such as locally fragmented coffee production before the introduction of FT) and hence can-
not be modelled as a differentiated variety demanded by CES customers. By so doing, it imposes product
differentiation among firms/farmers before the actual introduction of Fair Trade.
19In the Appendix we also provide a model extension in which we assume that the price of FT coffee does
not impact the demand for regular coffee.
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[Realized FT] : SWF = πSF
[Realized N] : SWN = SN + (1− π) SF ,






of the total population of farmers choose to participate in the FT scheme, they
are not able to sell exclusively to FT markets. Not being able to find enough buyers, their
remaining harvest (1− π) SF has to be sold through conventional channels.
































It is possible to show that there exists an equilibrium under standard conditions, using the
Implicit Function Theorem (IFT). The assumptions of the IFT require the existence of a
solution in one point, and non-singularity of the Jacobian of the equilibrium conditions. This
in fact imposes mild conditions on the supply and demand functions. The existence of an
equilibrium is not the prime focus of our paper and we thus do not provide a detailed proof.
A numerical example later shows that some equilibria indeed exist. Furthermore, in the
Appendix we discuss informally the existence of equilibria in a model with middlemen.
Lemma 2.1 Under standard conditions on supply and demand functions, there exists an
equilibrium for a range of FT prices pF .
The following lemma shows that the presence of Fair Trade in our model benefits all
farmers under quite general conditions.
Lemma 2.2 Given that markets clear (i.e., π = 1), the incomes of all farmers (weakly)
increase if and only if the total realized demand does not fall after the introduction of the Fair
Trade market.
Proof. If the overall realized demand in a new Fair Trade equilibrium remains constant,
it can exist only if the participating farmers are relatively better off than selling through
the conventional channels. The normal farmers’ payoffs are furthermore unchanged due to a
constant price p.
If the overall realized demand in a new Fair Trade equilibrium increases, the non-participating
farmers have to be better off since the actual increase only becomes possible if the previously
inactive farmers enter the production and this can only happen once the purchase price of
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Figure 2.2: Shift away from normal coffee when Fair Trade is introduced (total demand
increases)
normal coffee p rises. Furthermore, the participating farmers are unambiguously better off
using the same argument as in the case of a small Fair Trade market.
If the total realized demand declines following the introduction of Fair Trade, the fall in
the consumption of conventional coffee has been less than compensated by the purchase of
Fair Trade coffee. As a result, normal farmers become worse off. Some FT farmers may be
better off.
In other words, unless total realized demand does not fall after the introduction of the
Fair Trade market, the very introduction of the scheme by the Fair Trade Organization absent
any price-setting constraints helps the participating farmers and at least does not hurt the
incomes and participation of normal coffee producers. Figure 2.2 illustrates the case where
the total realized demand has increased after the introduction of Fair Trade despite a shift
away from normal coffee. This happened due to a more-than-compensating rise of Fair Trade
consumption.
This result is somewhat similar to third degree price discrimination, where the effect of
the discrimination depends on whether it decreases the output.20 As in the literature on
third degree price discrimination, we are also concerned here with the impact of opening a
new market. In addition to that, we study how fixing the price on the newly open market
affects the previous market. The first question is thus similar to the question in the literature
on price discrimination, even though the decision to open the new market is not made by the
seller(s) on the old market and each consumer makes purchases on both markets.
Our paper, due to the general structure of the demand side, does not allow us to study
in detail the welfare effects of opening a new market with FT coffee and setting an above-
equilibrium price on it. For example, if opening the new market reduces the quantity traded
on the normal market, the effect on farmers and consumers is heterogeneous. Some farmers
(those remaining on regular market) are worse off because of the fall in price; those moving
to the FT market may be better off and similarly for consumers. Increasing the price of FT
coffee may have positive effects for some FT farmers and farmers on the regular market (due
to substitution effects), but may hurt consumers. Unfortunately, a deeper analysis of these
effects is impossible without explicitly modelling the demand side.
20We are grateful to Roland Strausz for suggesting this similarity.
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Assuming that the equilibrium exists, we are now interested in how it compares with the
market-clearing equilibrium at which there is no excess supply on the FT market (π = 1).
Lemma 2.3 If there are no middlemen, an increase in price pF above its market-clearing







All proofs are provided in the Appendix, unless noted otherwise.
Lemma 2.4 By increasing the price pF above its market-clearing level, the farmers’ partici-
pation in the Fair Trade scheme increases if and only if∣∣∣∣εDNpF SWNSWF
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣επpF ∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣εDFpF ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣επpF ∣∣∣ .
The payoffs of farmers participating in Fair Trade decrease unambiguously relative to the
market-clearing case.
The intuition behind both lemmas is quite straightforward. Holding other things constant,
if the Fair Trade Organization sets the contracting price pF above its market-clearing level
so as to maximize farmers’ participation in Fair Trade, the demand for Fair Trade has to
fall. Despite the concomitant rise of the demand for conventional coffee (we assume that
the indirect price effect is weaker than the direct one), the excess supply of coffee remains
preserved and translates into corresponding pressure to reduce the price p. Furthermore, if
the demand elasticities are low vis-à-vis excess-supply elasticity επ
pF
,21 the decrease in price
p becomes so pronounced that it makes the Fair Trade scheme more attractive and thus
increases participation. In such a situation the effects of the minimum price pF resemble the
impact of the minimum wage in labor markets with heterogeneous oligopsonists (Manning
(2003)). While the actual mechanism at work varies in each case, both results point to the
importance of agent heterogeneity in the modelling of market interventions. This result has
a simple corollary.
Corollary 2.1 In the excess-supply equilibrium with π < 1, the participation in the Fair
Trade scheme can increase relative to the market-clearing case with π = 1. This might happen
despite the fall of the participating farmers’ payoffs.
Increasing the price pF above its market-clearing level hurts all farmers regardless of their
status, since both the price of the regular coffee p and the probability of being able to sell
Fair Trade π more than offsets the initial benefit of a higher FT price pF . The previous result
holds even if participation in the Fair Trade scheme actually rises. The FT market becomes
relatively more attractive than the regular market, yet the FT payoffs of the switching farmers
fall short of the normal-coffee payoffs earned in the market-clearing equilibrium. Had this
not been the case, the switching farmers would have acted irrationally in the first place by
having chosen normal coffee production in the market-clearing equilibrium.
Nonetheless, given the positive impact of the introduction of the Fair Trade market and
monotonically decreasing farmers’ payoffs, the FT farmers are still better off as compared to
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the setup with the non-existent Fair Trade market. To see this, note that if the Fair Trade
price pF were gradually raised up to the level prohibiting the existence of the Fair Trade
market, all farmers would supply to the normal market, thus imitating the equilibrium with
a single existing market for normal coffee.
In the following, we move away from the analysis of farmers’ individual payoffs and instead
explore the impact of the excess-supply price pF both on the aggregated profits of all farmers
and on Fair Trade participants only. The aggregated profits serve as a proxy for resources
available for community investment.22
Lemma 2.5 In the excess-supply equilibrium with π < 1, the aggregated profits of all farmers
are decreasing.
The fact that the total profit of all farmers is decreasing in pF does not tell us whether it
is because the profits of both Fair Trade and regular farmers decrease, or because one group
benefits in the aggregate while the other does not. The following lemma partially answers
this question. It formalizes the intuition that Fair Trade farmers cannot benefit in aggregate
if their participation decreases as a result of an increase in price pF . Note that the lemma
actually strengthens this result by showing that even an increase in participation may not be
sufficient to guarantee an increase in their profits.
Lemma 2.6 If the participation of Fair Trade farmers decreases as a result of an increase
in pF , then the overall Fair Trade farmers’ profit decreases.
The observation is straightforward, since we already know that an increase in pF above
its market-clearing level lowers the profits of Fair Trade farmers.23 The only theoretical
possibility thus remains the case when the participation in Fair Trade increases. However,
such a condition is not sufficient given the simultaneous fall of Fair Trade farmers’ individual
profits (see the Appendix). We will return to the possibility of increased overall Fair Trade
profits (driven by participation) in the following section with middlemen.
Summary of the results in the world without middlemen
In this section we focused on the effect of the introduction of a Fair Trade market and a
binding minimum price pF in a setup without the presence of monopsonistic middlemen. Our
interim results assign a generally positive role to Fair Trade in that setting up a new market
might improve the matching of consumers’ preferences with farmers’ supply. On the other
hand, the results conform to the critiques expressed e.g. in The Economist (2006) or the
Washington Post (2005), claiming that the excess supply caused by the binding minimum
price policy of the FLO tends to depress the incomes of the non-participating farmers. This
22The literature on Fair Trade lists a number of benefits of Fair Trade that the present framework addresses
only indirectly or not at all (for a brief outline and references see the Appendix). One of the frequently
mentioned improvements concerns the pooling of resources for the production of positive externalities. Ronchi
(2002) reports the efforts of the Costa Rican cooperative COOPELDOS aimed at the maintenance of local
roads, other cooperatives provide a number of services such as extended credit or reforestation support also to
non-members. Strong rural linkages operating through large expenditure shares of local non-tradeables (e.g.,
perishable and/or locally processed foods and services) have been emphasized in a study by Winters et al.
(2004).
23In the absence of quantity adjustment at the farmer’s individual level, payoffs and profits can be used
interchangeably.
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happens through the decline in the normal coffee price p, which in addition forces some of
the most disadvantaged to leave coffee production and seek outside options. In this respect
the Fair Trade scheme does not help farmers as much as it potentially could, which also
translates into profits at the aggregate level. Nonetheless, we assert that once the new Fair
Trade market per se boosts the farmers’ incomes, the excess-supply regime still outperforms
the initial situation with a single market for normal coffee.
In the following section we allow for a specific kind of market failure on the normal coffee
market and incorporate monopsonistic middlemen, restricting the access to world markets.
We will focus on the relationship between Fair Trade, farmers’ and middlemen’s incomes and
the behavior of the normal coffee price p.
2.4.2 Fair Trade in a world with middlemen
Previous sections have dealt with two interconnected markets absent any intermediaries.
The middlemen, however, play a significant role in the overall distribution chain and their
allegedly exploitative position in fact stood at the very roots of the whole Fair Trade movement
(see previous sections). For these reasons we extend the model to allow for the presence of
intermediaries. These middlemen purchase coffee from local farmers and they have sole access
to world markets.
1. FTO sets price pF .
2. Middlemen set price pM .
3. Farmers choose between no production, regular coffee production and FT coffee pro-
duction.
4. Production and trade take place.
We assume that such a middleman is small with respect to global markets, yet she holds
some monopsony power vis-à-vis the farmers.24 Farmers’ choices are identical to those from
the previous market-clearing case, yet now instead of the global market price p they receive
a price pM offered by the middleman. We assume farmers have expectations about the
probability π of being able to sell their production on the FT market. The case π = 1
corresponds to no excess supply, while if π < 1 there is excess supply.
The middleman’s problem





SN + (1− π) SF
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24Our timing also requires that the middlemen can commit to a given price and to buy any amount of
coffee from farmers at that price. The second restriction is not binding because in a rational expectations
equilibrium, middlemen correctly expect the amount of coffee supplied by the farmers.
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which for a given π leads25 to an implicit solution for pM .





































One can immediately observe that the middleman’s optimal price pM is a function of
the success rate of Fair Trade farmers π, the price of the Fair Trade coffee pF , and the
price p the middleman receives on the world market with conventional coffee. The following
lemma summarizes the relationship between the purchase price pM and the above-mentioned
variables.






> 0, and ∂p
M
∂p > 0.
Proof. We provide an intuition for this statement; the formal proof is standard. An increase
in the success rate π or the Fair Trade price pF might make the middleman lose part of the
available farmers’ supply. In response to this, the middleman partly compensates farmers
by raising her purchase price pM . Similarly, a higher selling price p boosts the middleman’s
revenues and allows further adjustment on the cost side.
More formally, the middleman sets the optimal price pM so as to equate the two expres-
sions. If π, pF , or p increases, the marginal revenue loss for a given pM increases, while the
marginal cost savings fall or remain unchanged. Since the marginal gains in revenues from
additional normal coffee purchases exceed the corresponding marginal costs if pM is relaxed,
it is optimal26 for the middleman to raise the purchase price to pM ′ in order to compensate
for the improved outside options of the farmers (upward shifts in π and/or pF ) or to exploit
favorable conditions on world markets (higher p).
One can also note that the middleman’s optimal price setting means that any market
developments reflected in price p translate only indirectly and typically in a less pronounced
way into farmers’ revenues.27
25Even though we normalize the number of regions (n = 1) and thus also the number of middlemen for
technical simplicity, the model is based on the assumption of a large number of regions. For example, each
middleman does not take into account his impact on π, because the excess supply on the FT market depends
on the behavior of other middlemen. If there was only one middleman, he would be able to take π as dependent
on his price pM , significantly complicating the model.
26The second order condition implies that the slope of the marginal cost-savings function is steeper than the
slope of the marginal revenue loss function. As a result, the equality can be restored only at a higher price
pM .
27One can conjecture that in most cases ∂p
M
∂p
< 1, but the proof depends on the behavior of the derivative of
density function g′. Thus, there might exist an equilibrium in which even ∂p
M
∂p
> 1. For uniform distribution,







The equilibrium and comparative statics
We start with an analysis of the equilibrium where the FTO decides on a price regime pF
when the middleman is present. If the participating farmers sell only part of their production
through the Fair Trade channel, the rest is sold to the middleman.
The farmer’s choices change to:
no production: pM < c &
[
πpF + (1− π)pM
]
− c < f,
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where pM is the middleman’s optimal price, taking into account the part of the Fair Trade
production that could not match Fair Trade markets. As before, we restrict our attention to
the case c = kf. Similar to the previous case when the middleman is not present, one has to
distinguish between farmers’ local participation choices and the realized supplies.
We have


















[Realized FT] : SWF = πSF ,
[Realized N] : SWN = SN + (1− π) SF .



































Lemma 2.8 Given that markets clear (i.e., π = 1), all farmers are better off if and only if
the price pM offered by the middleman increases once the FT market opens. This happens
either if the downward adjustment of the world normal coffee price p stays relatively modest,
or if the price p actually increases in response to the new FT market.
The statement of the preceding lemma conforms to our results from Lemma 2.2 that dealt
with the world without middlemen. In fact, the present results are slightly stronger than
those from Lemma 2.2. The reason is that contrary to the case without middlemen, the
non-participating farmers now fare strictly better even if the price of normal coffee remains
unchanged. This happens as a consequence of the strategic behavior of the middleman,
who finds it profitable to adjust her price pM slightly so as to mute the outflow of farmers
towards Fair Trade. A direct consequence of the middleman’s behavior is also that the non-
participating farmers can be better off even if the normal coffee price p falls, given that the
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effect of a decline in price p does not outweigh the positive effect of Fair Trade farmers’
improved access to world markets.
Moving to the comparative statics, we are now interested in how the price of normal coffee
p changes once the FTO sets price pF above its market-clearing level (i.e., π < 1).
Lemma 2.9 Assume that ∂p
M
∂π > 0 is small enough. In the presence of middlemen, an
increase in price pF above its market-clearing level increases the excess supply (1− π) and
might reduce or increase the price of regular coffee p.








































First of all, an increase in π following the departure from market clearing is not a viable option
given that π = 1 and π ∈ 〈0, 1〉. Secondly, while further away from the market-clearing price




> 0.28 We do not find such an adjustment setting plausible and instead
focus on the remaining options. Thus, there are only two interesting cases where an increase













Note that the results from the previous lemma differ markedly from the setup with no
middlemen and contradict the statements by The Economist (2006) regarding the declining
normal coffee prices in the excess-supply regime. Given that an excess supply of Fair Trade
coffee is indeed able to influence the prices of regular coffee, these can in principle move in both
directions. In particular, the arguments relying on the price mechanism operating through
world markets do not take into account the presence of market failure in the distribution chain.
The introduction of the Fair Trade channel mitigates the negative impact of the middlemen
restricting coffee supplies. The Fair Trade excess-supply regime, on the other hand, returns
28The following lemma states that dp
M
dpF





> 0. But then the realized Fair Trade demand DF has to increase even more than Fair Trade supply




part of the market power back to the middlemen, reintroduces previous inefficiency and in
some cases might even lead to an actual increase in the prices of regular coffee. Within the
discussion of the excess-supply’s impact on the incomes of farmers, nonetheless, our results
conform to The Economist (2006)’scritique.
Lemma 2.10 In the excess-supply equilibrium with π < 1, the non-participating farmers are
unambiguously worse off relative to the situation with the market-clearing Fair Trade scheme










< 0 in order to have a viable equilibrium. If dp
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< 0, otherwise the monopsonist does not behave optimally.
Consider the situation of an increased price pF . Given that price pF rises and holding price
p constant, the demand for Fair Trade falls, so the part of production previously sold as Fair
Trade needs to be sold via middlemen to normal markets. Given pM and p and regardless of
farmers’ participation choices, the middlemen now face a higher supply from farmers and can
adjust optimally. Increasing pM given p would decrease their profits even if one ignores the
unexpected windfall coming from FT. The reason is that in such a case the middlemen would
not have been optimizing ex ante in the first place. Taking into account the windfall would
make their decision even more unprofitable at the margin. So the middlemen will adjust by
decreasing the purchase price pM .
Similarly to the setup without middlemen, we explore the impact of the excess-supply
price pF both on the aggregated profits of all farmers and on Fair Trade participants only.
Lemma 2.11 If π < 1, dπ
dpF
< 0, and dp
M
dpF
< 0 in an equilibrium, then the revenue of all
farmers is decreasing in pF above its equilibrium value.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 2.6, if one substitutes pM in place of
p. The difference between these cases comes from the difference between prices p and pM . In
the case of a market with middlemen, price p is not directly relevant for the decision making




< 0 in the case with middlemen or dp
dpF
< 0 without middlemen, our numerical
example (see Figures 2.3–2.5) show that both cases are possible in general and the first is
in fact prevalent. Intuitively, such an outcome happens because the probability of successful
trade π decreases enough to offset any favorable increase in price.
Lemma 2.12 If the participation of FT farmers decreases as pF increases, then the aggregate
FT farmers’ profits decrease.
Proof. Again, use pM instead of p to obtain the proof.
The preceding lemmas show that it is very unlikely that the aggregate profits of any
group of farmers would increase as a consequence of the excess supply Fair Trade regime.
Again, the only theoretical possibility remains an increase in the aggregate Fair Trade profits.
However, our numerical results produce falling aggregate profits regardless of the participation
patterns.29
29The same holds for the simulation results in the setup without middlemen.
50 CHAPTER 2. FAIR TRADE
The present setup with monopsonistic middlemen helped us understand the effects of the
introduction of a new Fair Trade market and the negative impact of a minimum binding price
on both the normal farmers’ incomes and the aggregate profits. Nonetheless, we would also
like to analyze the relationship between the excess supply, the participation patterns of both
types of farmers, the income of Fair Trade farmers and profits of the middlemen. Since the
comparative statics with general demands and supply distributions proves to be excessively
complex, in the next subsection we illustrate a number of model outcomes on an example
with explicit functional forms.
Example with explicit demands
In this subsection, we analyze the links between participation, incomes, middlemen’s profits
and the excess supply on a specific example with quasilinear demand preferences and uniform
productivity distribution. We specify demand functions using a model of consumers that
considers normal and Fair Trade coffee to be imperfect substitutes. Let’s assume a quasilinear
utility function
Ũ = U(xN , xFT ) + Q













γ ∈ 〈0, 1〉, α, δ > 0,
where xN and xF are consumptions of normal and FT, Q is the numeraire good. Note that
while Richardson and Stähler (2007) treat FT and normal products as perfect substitutes,
we take an alternative approach and model the Fair Trade good as an imperfect substitute
for normal coffee. In our framework, the degree of substitutability γ is assumed to depend
negatively on the ”warm glow” effect discussed by Andreoni (1990), which in the present
context reflects the additional utility due to the consumption of coffee grown under “fair”
standards. Note that higher γ implies a “lower warm glow effect”, i.e., regular and FT coffee
are easier to substitute.
Consumers maximize their utility given the budget constraint
pxN + pF xF + Q ≤ M.





















In the following we plot three groups of graphs with our numerical results, each group cap-
turing a specific model dimension. For all graphs, the x-axis represents the excess of the Fair
Trade price pF above its market equilibrium value. The results have been derived for three
different values of the substitution parameter γ, namely 0 (dot), 0.5 (circle) and 0.99 (x).
The first group depicts the behavior of equilibrium prices p and pM and the proportion of
production going to Fair Trade π. The graphs show that the proportion of production sold
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on Fair Trade markets π decreases with the excess pF , but this effect is smaller if γ is lower,
i.e., when the two types of coffee are harder to substitute. In particular, lower γ leads to
a relatively milder drop in the Fair Trade demand, hence the equilibrating adjustment of π
does not have to be as pronounced.
Consistent with Lemma 2.10, the graphs also show that the equilibrium price p on the
market for normal coffee can be both increasing and decreasing with pF , depending again on
the degree of substitutability. If both types of coffee are easier to substitute (higher γ), then
the increase in price pF leads to a likewise increase in the price of normal coffee p.
The reason for the co-movement of prices pF and p is the congruent working of the demand
for normal coffee and the middleman’s incentives to cut costs.30 Holding farmers’ expectations
regarding π and p constant, the initial rise in the Fair Trade price pF reduces the Fair Trade
demand. The released Fair Trade output has to be rechanneled back to the middleman. With
a higher degree of substitutability γ, this output volume becomes larger, the middleman has
a stronger incentive to lower the purchase price pM , and more of the least productive farmers
are thus pushed out of the normal coffee market. At the same time, the cross-price reaction
of the demand for normal coffee rises with γ and further dampens the extent of the potential
coffee glut. As a result, for a sufficiently strong combination of the middleman’s price cutting
and demand cross-price effects the overall outcome might be a higher normal coffee price p.
Our numerical results in Figure 2.3 conform to the theoretical possibility of a rising price p
in the excess-supply regime.
We have already discussed the middlemen’s motivation to reduce the purchase price pM
in the excess-supply equilibrium (see Lemma 2.11). The last graph illustrates how the excess
supply of Fair Trade coffee strengthens the position of the middlemen relative to Fair Trade
with market clearing.31 As the middlemen’s profit margin increases with γ, one might even
observe a decline in the living standards of normal farmers and the least effective farmers
leaving the market, despite a simultaneous increase in the world price of normal coffee p.
The second group of plots shows how profits depend on the excess of pF above its market
equilibrium value. Farmers’ aggregate profits are decreasing in the degree of substitutability
between normal and Fair Trade coffee. One can also see how the Fair Trade excess supply
regime benefits the middlemen and how the increasing level of γ boosts their profits. The
closer substitutes both kinds of coffee are, the faster the middlemen’s profits rise both at the
intensive (p− pM ) and the extensive (SWN ) margin.
Finally, we plot graphs that describe farmers’ participation choices and realized supplies
as functions of the excess-supply price pF . The farmers’ participation choices are described in
plots labelled “normal supply” and “FT supply”. The reader will notice that the participation
30Remember that such a constellation would not be possible in the world without middlemen, since there is
no mechanism that would work against the downward pressure on the prices of conventional coffee.
31In our discussion of the model’s adjustment mechanism, we assume that the middleman is not able to
distinguish between normal and Fair Trade farmers so that she offers the same price pM to both groups. In
other words, the middleman is not able to discriminate between the two types of producers. The middleman’s
ability to ration depending on the producer type would lead to the optimal response pM being set to zero for
unsold Fair Trade production, which would in turn lower the Fair Trade farmers’ expected payoffs as well as
their participation in the scheme. The remaining participating farmers would then de facto play an infinite
lottery with the probability π of winning pF − c − f and the probability 1 − π of making a loss − (c + f).
While we did not find any empirical evidence on middlemen’s discrimination based on farmers’ status, the
main reason for our non-rationing assumption is that the lottery setup represents a rather special sub-case of
the present model with no significant changes in results.
Of course, by decreasing pM , the middleman forgoes some farmers on the produce/stay inactive margin, yet
this amount depends on γ only indirectly through the middleman’s reaction to the released Fair Trade output.
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium quantities
in the Fair Trade scheme initially rises yet eventually decreases as the difference between
the FT price pF and the market-clearing price increases. At these levels, the Fair Trade
participation declines sharply as many previously Fair Trade farmers now switch back to the
normal coffee production. Given that the middlemen’s purchase price pM falls continuously,
it is precisely this group of farmers that drive the postponed increase of the normal coffee
supply.
The participation choices differ from the pattern of realized trades, since part of the Fair
Trade harvest has to be sold through conventional markets. The plots labeled “Realized
FT trades” and “Middlemen output” capture the actual volumes of trade transacted on each
market. These plots again confirm that the greatest benefactor from the excess-supply regime
are in fact not the farmers, but paradoxically the middlemen.
Summary of the results in the world with middlemen
In this section we focused on the effect of the introduction of the Fair Trade market and
binding minimum price pF in a setup with monopsonistic middlemen. Our results conform
to the generally positive role for Fair Trade discussed in the previous section. Furthermore,
they convey a number of additional conclusions that either complement or replace the non-
middlemen setup.
First of all, the common claims that the excess supply caused by the binding minimum
price policy of the FLO tends to depress world prices and thus the incomes of the non-
participating farmers are not quite precise. The normal coffee price p might in fact increase
due to the market failure in the distribution chain - the middlemen. Nonetheless, the impact
on the non-participating farmers’ incomes remains negative. The reason is that in the present
setup there exist two channels through which Fair Trade affects the incomes of farmers. In
comparison with the world without middlemen, the first channel has strengthened in that the
Fair Trade market boosts incomes not only through the improved matching of farmers’ output
54 CHAPTER 2. FAIR TRADE
with differentiated demand, but also by dampening the market power of the middlemen. The
second channel, i.e. the negative impact of the minimum price pF , has however likewise
became stronger. The minimum contracting price policy now returns part of the market
power back to the middlemen, who in fact become the greatest benefactors of this regime
relative to the Fair Trade market with flexible price.
2.5 Conclusion
The recent success story of Fair Trade has provoked a lively debate on the scope and intensity
of the scheme’s actual benefits and shortcomings. We develop a simple framework and find
that the introduction of a new Fair Trade market has the capacity to improve the living
conditions of all farmers. The scheme’s potential is not fully met, however, as the FTO’s
supplementary policy of a minimum contracting price brings about costs in terms of the lower-
than-possible payoffs of the majority of farmers, the higher-than-necessary exit of the non-
participating farmers from the coffee production, and less resources for community investment.
The above equilibrium Fair Trade price can be justified merely as a policy of increasing
farmers’ participation within the Fair Trade scheme.
The major beneficiary of the minimum price policy are paradoxically the middlemen whose
allegedly exploitative position stood at the very roots of the whole Fair Trade movement.
In our numerical example we show that the middlemen use their monopsony position to
appropriate part of the farmers’ payoffs that would have been realized under the market-
clearing setup. The excess supply thus allows the middlemen to exploit the farmers more
than they could in the case of market clearing on the Fair Trade market. The profitability of
the excess-supply regime for the middlemen also raises with the substitutability (as measured
by γ) between normal and Fair Trade coffee. For a high degree of substitutability, one might
even observe an increase in the world price of normal coffee p and a simultaneous decline in
the living standards of normal farmers.
Our paper does not focus on certain aspects of Fair Trade, including the impact on mi-
gration and the local environment, self-governance, credibility or the nation-wide reallocation
of resources. By no means do we claim that these concerns are of lesser or no importance.
Nonetheless, given the absence of an integrated modelling approach, we focus on a specific
area of interest and analyze it within a well-defined framework. This area relates to the
distributional impact of the Fair Trade scheme.
The model’s results should serve as a comment on the potential risks and limitations of
the otherwise relatively successful Fair Trade scheme. It seems quite reasonable that the very
existence of Fair Trade alleviates the informational asymmetry between “socially-conscious”
Western consumers, distributors and farmers located in developing countries. Given that
consumers value “fair” production, the absence of credible information and non-negligible
fixed costs related to setting up markets hinders the functioning of the Fair Trade market and
some sort of market intervention thus might be justified. Nonetheless, the scheme’s optimal
design remains an open question and we hope to provide at least a partial answer.
From the policy perspective, we agree that the guaranteed minimal pF can take a number
of other important roles such as insurance against volatile coffee prices or an improved outside
option for the farmers participating in sharecropping agreements. Our results should rather
be understood as a selective contribution to the debate on the benefits of alternative policy
instruments. For example, the stability of Fair Trade prices can be achieved through other
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instruments than a fixed minimum price. The related problem of the excess supply on Fair
Trade markets can be addressed e.g. through the introduction of a pre-determined sched-
ule and gradual replacement of established Fair Trade producers by their less experienced
counterparts.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Model without middlemen
Comparative statics








































































, SFp = −g(t)
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Substituting for supply relationships and expressed in a convenient matrix form we obtain:




































































































. Of course, in the overall equilibrium both equations have to be satisfied















































|DNp | > DFp . This implies that the solution has to satisfy dπdpF < 0,
dp
dpF
< 0. This is easy
to see - while both relationships are not linear, the intercept of (2.5) is unambiguously lower
than the intercept of (2.6), while the slope of (2.5) is positive yet not as steep as that of (2.6).
This implies that both curves (given that they exist and are continuous, which we assume)







32 Alternatively, one can express dp
dpF



















Once this is established, one can infer that dπ
dpF
< 0 from (2.5).
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The impact of Fair Trade on farmers’ payoffs and participation
Proof of Lemma 2.4. 1) In the excess-supply equilibrium, the farmers’ participation in
the Fair Trade scheme increases if and only if
∣∣∣εDFpF ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣επpF ∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∣εDNpF SWNSWF
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣επpF ∣∣∣ .
The payoffs of farmers participating in Fair Trade decrease unambiguously relative to the
market-clearing case.








pation in the Fair Trade certification scheme.































Consider an increase of pF above its equilibrium value. In the new equilibrium, the realized















































































Pre-multiplying the term in the brackets by p
F
DF










































∣∣∣εDFpF ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣επpF ∣∣∣ .
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< 0, multiply the term in the brackets by p
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∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣επpF ∣∣∣ .
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2) In the excess-supply equilibrium without middlemen, the Fair Trade farmers’ payoffs
decrease unambiguously.













< 0, so for more negative values of dπ
dpF
the change in farmer’s revenues from FT











represents the marginal value of dπ
dpF























π + (pF − p) dπdpF︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0







π + (pF − p) dπdpF︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 . (2.7)







































π + (pF − p) dπdpF︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0




















which is the best possible impact on the Fair Trade farmers’ payoffs that is consistent with
the excess-supply equilibrium.
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Proof of Corollary 2.1. Following the rise of the Fair Trade price, the participation in
the Fair Trade scheme can increase despite the fall of the participating farmers’ payoffs.





















































Hence the sign of the total derivative depends on the sign of the part in square brackets. Even
if the Fair Trade payoffs decline after the move from π = 1, i.e.,
d
(




the bracketed term can be positive since − dp
dpF
> 0.
2.6.2 Model with middlemen
Existence of equilibria with middlemen
In order to proceed with the analysis, we will assume that there exists an equilibrium in
which both markets are active, and which generates market-clearing prices p and pF , i.e. an
equilibrium in which π = 1. This section informally discusses under which conditions the
equilibrium will exist. We do not claim that these conditions are necessary, as the existence
of the equilibrium is not of our primary interest. In particular, we discuss the price ranges
for which one may hope to find an equilibrium.
The market-clearing conditions are





























Obviously, we may have equilibrium only if
0 ≤ SF ≤ 1, 0 ≤ SN ≤ 1, SF + SN ≤ 1.
We will be interested in those equilibria in which both markets are active. In case of a uniform
distribution G(x) = x, g(x) = 1, we can discuss a range of prices for which there might be an
equilibrium.
0 < SF , 0 < SN , SF + SN ≤ 1.





2 (k + 1)
≤ 1.
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Figure 2.6: Participation constraints depending on p, pF for k = 1 (full line) and k = 0.5
(dashed line).
The other two constraints are
(2k + 1)pF − p(1 + k) > 0, p + kp− pF > 0.
The possible combination of prices p, pF is the triangle on the Figure 2.6.
We can see that if k decreases, which means that it is relatively cheaper for all farmers to
produce FT coffee, the set of prices that might correspond to an equilibrium shrinks. This
is an intuitive result - for very low k, it is cheap to obtain an FT certificate and thus prices
on the regular market (p) must be close to the FT prices (pF ) in the market equilibrium.
Note that this result holds in the excess supply equilibrium with appropriate modifications
to the picture (pF has to be replaced with πpF on the supply side). The expected value from
participation in the FT and regular markets must be similar if the participation costs in the
FT market are low.
The impact of Fair Trade on farmers’ payoffs and participation with the middle-
men
Proof of Lemma 2.9. All farmers are better off if and only if the price pM offered by the
middlemen increases once the FT market opens. This happens if the overall demand for coffee
does not fall substantially, i.e., if the world price of normal coffee p is relatively insensitive to
the price of FT coffee pF , or if it actually increases as a result of the new FT market. It is easy
to observe that compared to the situation without Fair Trade, all farmers benefit only if the
price of coffee set by middleman pM increases and such increases indeed attract new farmers.
If the price pM decreases, some FT farmers might be better off than before, but there is a
group of farmers who stop selling coffee altogether. These farmers lose, since in the absence of
FT they used to make small yet positive profits. In general, the middleman’s price pM might
move either way, because the movement of the price p is ambiguous and might dominate the
other effects working through the Fair Trade price pF or the success rate π. Nonetheless, it is
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easy to show that for fixed p, price pM ′ in the world with an active FT market is larger than






g(pM )−G(pM ) = 0
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It is obvious that once we plug in the values of pM and p from the first line, the last element on



















































Since the marginal gains in revenues from additional normal coffee purchases exceed the
corresponding marginal costs for pM from the world without Fair Trade, it is optimal for the
middleman to raise the purchase price to pM ′. Thus the inequality implies that pM ′ > pM .
This argument requires that the first order condition of the FT market middleman is
monotonic (unique local maximum) and that p is fixed. If the world price p is not very
sensitive to the introduction of FT coffee (e.g., the FT market is small), then the argument
holds by continuity (expression (2.10) remains positive for small changes in p). It is obvious to
see that if p actually increases, then the argument holds as well, so the only case when it might
not hold is when p decreases significantly as a result of the FT market opening. However, this
can only happen once the overall world demand declines sharply after the introduction of Fair
Trade, which is consistent with our results from Lemma 2.2 that dealt with world without
middlemen. In fact, the results for the market-clearing case with middlemen are slightly
stronger than those in Lemma 2.2. In the world with the middlemen, the non-participating
farmers are better off even if the price of the normal coffee does not change. This happens as
a consequence of the strategic behavior of the middleman, who finds it profitable to adjust
her price pM slightly in order to mute the outflow of farmers towards Fair Trade. Hence the
non-participating farmers can fare better despite the possible fall of the normal coffee price
p, given that the decline is not too sharp.
Comparative statics in the world with middlemen
Proof of Lemma 2.10. Again, similarly to the excess supply analysis without middlemen























































where SWNπ is a partial derivative of S
WN with respect to π, for example.
Rearranging, one gets
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From Lemma 2.9, we know that ∂p
M
∂π > 0, so we need
∂pM
∂π to be small for this result to hold.





















is not possible, we need to show that if dπ
dpF
> 0, then dp
dpF















We know that A > 0 > C,D > 0 > B,F > 0 > E. So if dπ
dpF
> 0, A > 0, but E < 0, it must
be that B dp
dpF
< 0 in equilibrium, which means, because B < 0, that dp
dpF
> 0. The same
argument holds for the second equation: F > 0, the first element (C dπ
dpF
< 0) is negative, so
the second element on the second line must be positive. Since D > 0, it implies dp
dpF
> 0. So
the previous results about the impossibility of dπ
dpF
> 0 and dp
dpF
> 0 seem to be preserved.
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> 0 (not possible).
So one can see that an increase in FT price pF leads to an increased excess supply, but the
impact on the world price is ambiguous p.33
2.6.3 Aggregate farmers’ profits
Proof of Lemma 2.6. Unless the world price of coffee p increases significantly when the
price of FT coffee increases, the aggregated profit of all farmers is decreasing in pF above the
market equilibrium.
Revenues of the farmers in the excess-supply regime without middlemen is


















































































33Note that the effect on the world price, even if theoretically predicted, is likely to be extremely small given
the relative sizes of both markets. Thus, the result is more of a theoretical interest than a testable prediction.
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Since π ≤ 1 and π(p
F−p)






. We have already shown that dπ
dpF
< 0 in any relevant equilibrium. Thus, unless dp
dpF
> 0
and is large enough, the profit of all farmers is decreasing in pF above the market equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. If the participation of FT farmers decreases as a result of an increase
in pF , then the overall FT farmers’ profit decreases.
The revenue and costs of FT farmers:





We can compute the derivatives:
dR
dpF
























































































2.6.4 Small FT market - fixed p
We extend our analysis to the situation when the FT market is too small to impact the world
price p of coffee. For example, we may assume that there is a large number of regions, but in
only very few of them are farmers participating in Fair Trade. Middlemen, if present, adjust
to the FT market only if there are FT farmers in their region.
Lemma 2.13 If there are no middlemen, the Fair Trade market where the price is set to
clear the market always helps the farmers.
Proof. Since price p does not change, the number of active farmers G(p) does not change.
Those farmers who decide to sell on the FT market (G(p
F−p
k ) of them) are all better off,
because they could have stayed in the non-FT market
In the world where the FT market clears, but there are middlemen, the situation is slightly
more complicated. Middlemen react to the FT market and thus alter the revenue of non-FT
farmers. However, we have shown before that all active farmers are strictly better off if the
price pM increases and that this happens when p is not very sensitive to pF . We can thus
apply the same argument as in Lemma 2.9 here, because price p is assumed to be fixed. For
fixed p, the argument is very intuitive - middlemen increase the price to attract more farmers
to offset the loss from those who left for the FT market. This increase in price helps all
non-FT farmers, but FT farmers are still better off than non-FT ones.
Lemma 2.14 When the FT market clears, it helps all the farmers even if there are middle-
men.
Proof. See Lemma 2.9 and note that p is fixed.
In the case of the FT market with price pF above market equilibrium (and thus π < 1),
but no middlemen, we will analyze the impact of a small increase in pF . Farmers benefit if












We can use market equilibrium conditions to prove the following result.
Lemma 2.15 Farmers benefit from a marginal increase in pF if and only if
DF
pF





where t = π p
F−p
k .
Proof. We use comparative statics to show that






(p, pF )− π2k g(t)
G(t) + tg(t)
< 0,
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because DF
pF














The final case, excess supply on the FT market and middlemen on the normal coffee
market, is slightly more complicated. Because of the middlemen, farmers don’t get a fixed
price p for their normal coffee but price pM that in general depends on the price pF . The
equilibrium condition on the FT market is













< 1, and they do not increase their price too much when the probability












then the probability of successful trade on the FT market decreases when the FT price in-
creases.

























































we can conclude that ∂π
∂pF
< 0.
Note that this lemma also allows for the possibility that the probability of success on the
FT market (π) is locally increasing in pF . This happens when ∂p
M
∂pF
is very large and such a
condition is rather intuitive. If middlemen increase the price relative to an increase in pF ,
it is possible that more FT farmers switch back to regular coffee production. However, this
effect has to be stronger than a decrease in demand by FT coffee consumers. It is clear that
such a case is very unlikely.
Bibliography
Andreoni, J., “Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving”,
The Economic Journal, 100, 464-477, 1990
Bacon, Ch., “Confronting the coffee crisis: Can Fair trade, organic, and specialty coffees
reduce small-scale farmer vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?”, World Development, 33,
497-511, 2005
Broda, Ch. and Weinstein, E. D., “Globalization and the gains from variety”, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121(2), 541-585, 2006
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Chapter 3
How to Price Imperfect
Certification
Abstract:
This paper analyzes markets in which consumers do not directly observe the quality of the
products but form their expectations about the quality based on the outcome of voluntary
imperfect certification. I analyze how the certification fee impacts the decisions of the pro-
ducers to apply for a certificate and whether to supply goods of the required quality. I find
that there are both separating (only high quality producers apply for and obtain the certifi-
cate) and pooling (both high and low-quality producers apply for and obtain the certificate)
equilibria. I show that the pooling equilibrium exists when the certification fee is low, while
the separating equilibrium requires high certification fees. Since the pooling equilibrium is
not welfare optimal, low certification fee is not always beneficial. This result complements
Strausz (2005) who shows that high certification fees are required to prevent corruption of
the certifier.
Keywords: certification, imperfect testing technology, competition, adverse selection
JEL Classification: D43, D45, D82
3.1 Introduction
Certification systems are widely used to solve problems arising in situations of asymmetrical
information. In particular, when consumers purchase a product infrequently or learning the
quality is very costly, a certification system may lead to more efficient information transmis-
sion, because it replaces the need for individual consumer learning with a single certification
test for producers. Typically, there is a single certifier, who tests all applying producers and
assigns a single certificate to successful applicants (Lizzeri, 1999). However, there are also
several certification systems in which the owner of the certificate accredits several competing
firms, who conduct the tests in its name (organic farming, automobile emissions testing), pos-
sibly to lower the price of these tests. It is not known, neither theoretically nor empirically,
whether such attempts to lower the certification fee are in fact beneficial.
The example that motivates this research comes from the structure of organic farming
certification. A producer may use the word “organic” (in the USA) or “BIO” (in the EU) on
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his product only if he obtains a certificate from an accredited certifier. Governments often
accredit several firms (about two dozen in Germany and fifty-five in the USA). Even though
certifiers may use their own label, I will later argue that it seems likely that consumers do
not establish the reputation of individual certifiers because there is a large number of them,
in contrast with a single, unified label “organic”.
While this market structure creates new incentive problems regarding the necessary in-
vestment into the quality of testing,1 it is not clear that even reducing the certification fee
is welfare improving for a fixed quality of testing. The reason for this somewhat surprising
possibility is that the certification fee also helps separate high and low-quality producers.2
To understand when lower certification fees benefit society, caused for example by more com-
petition between certifiers, I study the effect these fees have on the entry decision of low and
high-quality producers.
These results should serve as a caution for the regulators of existing certification systems.
As these systems grow, the need for cheaper certification sometimes leads to calls for more
competition between certifiers. The competition between certifiers may be useful, as it reduces
monopoly rents that a single certifier is able to extract. However, excessive competition that
reduces the price of certification may lead to the entry of low-quality producers and harm the
trust of consumers in the certification systems. Price competition may result in the presence of
low-quality producers among the certified. A potential remedy for this problem is to improve
the quality of testing by stricter supervision (or accreditation) of the certifiers.
This paper complements Strausz (2005) who shows that the certification fee has to be
high enough to discourage the certifier from accepting bribes from producers, using a repeat-
purchase mechanism similar to Klein and Leffler (1981).
3.2 Certification of organic products
Organic food, believed by many to be healthier due to low or no content of pesticides, has
witnessed significant growth in the recent years. As organic products became available in
most supermarkets, the volume traded and the acreage of land producing organic products
grew significantly. Total acreage quadrupled from 1995 to 2005 in the USA alone, from about
1 million acres to 4 million (USDA, 2008e). The Organic Trade Association (2007) claims
that average yearly growth over the past ten years reached almost 20% and the total volume
of consumer sales reached $17.7 billion. It estimates that organic sales account for about 2.8%
of total food sales, with significantly faster growth.
This success lead to some questions about the meaning of the “organic” label (New Yorker,
2006). Both the European Union and the USA regulate organic production. They require
that producers of organic products (farmers and processors) obtain a certificate before they
label products as organic.3 Certificates can be obtained from accredited certifiers. Such
1If there are several certifiers among whom consumers do not distinguish, low-quality certification has
negative externalities on other certifiers. This suggests that certifiers may lack sufficient incentives to carefully
test applicants or to invest into testing technology, because they pay all the costs but benefit only partially
due to the shared reputation with other certifiers.
2This results has been also shown by Svitkova and Ortmann (2006) in a somewhat different setting. They
focus on how the choice of standards and fees by a certifier depends on its objective function when the
distribution of the quality of producers is fixed. This paper takes standards and fees as given and focuses on
how the choice of quality by producers depends on the quality of the testing procedure and fee for certification.
3In the USA, there are several categories with varying strictness (USDA, 2008b). Labeling requirements
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accreditation is provided by the USDA or the national governments in the EU. There are
currently 55 accredited certifiers in the USA. In the EU, each state accredits local certifiers,
but their certificates have EU-wide validity. It is possible to find only public certifiers in
certain member states and a number of competing private certifiers in others (European
Commission, 2005a). For example, Germany has currently 23 accredited private certifiers,
while the Netherlands has just one public certifier.
The certification process is costly and long, especially for farmers. Any farm interested in
producing organic products must enter a so-called transitional phase that lasts several years
(USDA, 2008d) during which the use of pesticides and other chemicals must fulfill organic label
criteria, yet products cannot be yet sold as organic. Regulation requires at least one on-site
inspection by a certifier every year, but also allows an unlimited number of additional visits
in case the certifier considers such visits necessary or suspects any wrongdoing. Apart from
certification costs, there are additional production costs related to organic food production.
For example, organic farming is claimed to have a lower yield and to require more labor than
traditional farming. On the other hand, there are subsidies for organic farmers that aim to
partially offset these extra costs. Since the organic products are sold at significantly higher
prices, these subsidies most likely do not fully cover these costs and “organic” production
remains more expensive than traditional production.
While the law specifies what is allowed in “organic” production and what is not, it does
not specify the details of certification. While regulation requires that certifiers collect any
samples4 (water, soil, seeds, plants) necessary to ascertain that forbidden substances are
not used on a farm applying for the organic certificate, it leaves the interpretation of this
requirement to the certifiers. A modification of the current rules suggested by public interest
groups to require at least 5% of unannounced visits every year was rejected by the USDA
because they “believe the certifying agent is in the best position to determine the need for
additional on-site inspections” (USDA, 2008a). Thus, the certifiers have a significant leeway
in enforcing the standards.
Surprisingly little is known about the supervision of certifiers. Typically, governments list
the requirements for the certifiers to become accredited and their initial evaluation. These
requirements are education, experience and expertise, necessary knowledge, and technical
equipment. Some governments also stipulate that certifiers cannot themselves be producers
of organic food, nor can they certify producers located in the same city as themselves. While
this somewhat limits the potential conflicts of interests, it is no panacea. It seems that
the USDA relies on the complaints from the public to monitor the behavior of certifiers.
However, complaints against farmers are referred to the certifiers and only complaints made
against certifiers are dealt with by the USDA. Their website shows only one case of suspension
or revocation of an accreditation of a certifier (USDA, 2008c).5
Governments typically require that a name (USA) or a unique identifier (EU) of a certifier
is present on most goods, exempting fruits and vegetables sold in bulk. This allows, at least
differ based on the statements on the product. Requirements for retailers in the USA are explained in detail
in USDA (2008d).
4A report by the European Commission (2005b) shows an interesting diversity in the number of samples
collected. While in Belgium, the number of samples reaches 60% of the total number of certified “operators”,
there is a large number of EU members where the percentage is close to zero (about 1%).
5There are no cases known to me in the European Union. However, this lack of evidence should not be
construed as proof of absence of such cases. Each member state accredits and monitors its own certifiers, which
makes it difficult to verify the number of cases for all member states.
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in theory, each consumer to establish the reputation of each certifier. I argue that such
an outcome seems unlikely for any significant portion of consumers, and I will assume in
the model that all certifiers share only the label “organic”. The justification for such an
assumption comes primarily from the large number of certifiers that each consumer may
be facing. Not only governments accredit several national certifiers, foreign certifiers are also
often allowed to sell their products as organic. This increases the number of potential certifiers
to several dozens. Moreover, consumers are often unable to evaluate the “organic” quality
themselves without incurring significant costs. In the case of the whole “organic” market,
consumers might form a reasonably precise estimate of quality of the organic testing based on
word-of-mouth, consumers testing or governmental reports, which might guarantee sufficient
flow of information. The information flow about each certifier may be smaller by an order
of magnitude. Additionally, careful observation of all information about all relevant certifiers
might be costly to the consumer.
Even though there is no direct evidence to support the assumption that certifiers do not
have a significant individual reputation, I will assume so for the sake of simplicity and clarity
of the model and its results. Thus, I can study the impact of the certification on market
outcomes and welfare.
3.3 Literature review
Certification as a solution to asymmetrical information problems was offered as a potential
remedy for Akerlof’s (1970) “lemon” problem by Viscusi (1978). Further research focused
mostly on models with perfect testing technology.
Lizzeri (1999) explains a puzzle: Certifiers typically award a single certificate as a docu-
ment of “passing” the tests, even though they learn more information during the test, which
they do not reveal. Lizzeri shows that awarding a single certificate to successful applicants is
in fact a profit maximizing strategy of a certifier. He also shows that it is a unique strategy
when the expected value of the product to the consumer is negative.
Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) show that middlemen, who purchase goods from various
producers and sell them to consumers can in fact take the role of a certifier. The reputation
building mechanism in this case is based on the loss on sales of other products. If a middleman
attempts to cheat its consumers, he is punished by reduced sales on other products. This
mechanism makes middlemen more trustworthy than a producer of one product line.
Strausz (2005) builds a model of certification where individual producers have exogenously
given quality, a certifier has perfect technology and upon testing, learns and reveals the true
quality. Consumers are able to learn the quality after consumption. In such a situation, a
certifier is able to build its reputation, similarly as in Klein and Leffler (1981), if a certification
fee is high enough to overcome the temptation to certify low-quality producers as being of
high quality for a bribe. Strausz also shows that the honesty of a certifier can be assured at
the lowest possible price only if the whole market is served by a unique certifier.
My model differs from Strausz’s in several key aspects, but complements his results. While
he focuses on the moral hazard problem of the certifier, I focus on the adverse selection of
low-quality producers. Strausz studies the incentives of a certifier to resist the temptation
of bribes; I study the impact of competition on the entry of high/low-quality producers. I
will show that the price of certification may be too low to prevent the entry of low-quality
producers.
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I assume that consumers cannot be systematically cheated (in a rational expectations
equilibrium) because they correctly expect the probability that certified products are organic.
I show that in the case of imperfect testing technology, low certification fees make the attempts
to obtain a certificate by non-organic farmers more attractive, which reduces the quality of
the certificate and welfare. Similarly to Strausz, I do not explicitly model the competition,
but I formally model only the impact that lower fees and lower quality testing technology
have on the long-run equilibria.
Thus, I show that lower certification fees, possibly as a result of competition between
certifiers, are not beneficial because of the behavior of the producers. This is a complement
to Strausz’s results that low certification fees make the honesty of the certifier less likely.
Little is known about what impact an imperfect testing technology has on market out-
comes, with the notable exception of two studies.
Svitkova and Ortmann (2006) study the role of the objective function of the certifier,
who can set the price of certification, quality and required quality standards, to screen a fixed
distribution of agents (charities in their case). In a situation where profit-maximizing certifiers
set zero standards and extract rents without actually testing the applicants, not-for-profit
certifiers choose positive standards, test the applicants, and thus achieve a separation of high-
and low-quality charities, even though the separation is imperfect. Due to the complexity of
such a model, their results are numerical. Even though our models are similar in spirit, I do
not impose any objective function on the certifier, and I focus on the role of the certification
fee and quality of testing on the participation decisions of the producers. In contrast to the
analysis of not-for-profit charities, I focus on profit-maximizing producers. I also assume that
consumers are heterogeneous, and quality can have only two levels (low and high).
A study by De and Nabar (1991) analyzes imperfect yet efficient testing technology, ie.,
the technology that makes high-quality producers more likely to pass the test. They assume
that the certifier informs consumers also about producers who applied for but failed the
test. This creates three categories of producers: those who applied and succeeded, applied
and failed, and did not apply at all. Because of these three categories, they do not find a
separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, only high-quality producers would apply
for a certificate, and thus both “failed” and successfully certified producers would be able to
sell their products for high prices equal to the valuation of a high-quality good.6 Any low-
quality producer has the incentive to apply for certification because even failed application
results in a high price for his good. Thus, there cannot be a separating equilibrium in such
a model. In contrast, I assume that the certifier reveals only successful applicants. In such
a market, the failed applicants sell in the market with producers who did not apply for a
certificate. A separating equilibrium may exist if the probability of failure of the low-quality
producer or the certification fee is sufficiently high.
The models also differ in additional assumptions and the focus of the analysis. I assume
heterogeneous consumers and endogenous entry both for high and low quality producers.
Moreover, I assume that high-quality producers have positive production costs, while De and
Nabar assume zero production costs for all producers. Finally, I assume an unlimited number
of potentially low-quality producers applying for certification, while De and Nabar assume a
fixed number and distribution of quality of producers.
Even though surprisingly little was published on the topic of competition between certi-
6Consumers are assumed to have rational expectations, and thus they would correctly expect both failed
and successful producers to sell high-quality products.
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fiers, there is some unpublished research available. A model of “Kosher Wars”, certification of
kosher food by Rabbis, is studied by Epstein and Gang (2002). Their model studies the choice
of the standards of certificates in a situation when consumers are able to distinguish between
different certifiers (each has his own “label”). The authors find that increasing the number
of congregations increases the standards. It is not clear that this is a result of competition
because more congregations implies more certifiers as well as more potential consumers.
Finally, a paper by Franzoni (1998) studies Cournot-like competition between certifiers
with endogenous quality of testing technology. The author makes a few very significant as-
sumptions that make the model easily tractable, yet somewhat unrealistic. Most importantly,
he assumes that the payoff to certified producers does not depend on the number of certified
producers or even on the average quality of the certified products. This implies that con-
sumers are systematically being fooled or are not behaving rationally. Even though there is
an explicit form of supervision by the government (in the form of the imperfect liability of
certifiers), certifiers are not interested in the quality of the label. In contrast, I believe that
certifiers are somewhat motivated by the success of their certificates, yet when they share
the certificate with competitors, these incentives may not be sufficient. I also focus on ratio-
nal expectations equilibria, in which consumers expect average quality of certified products
correctly. I do not model competition between certifiers explicitly and instead focus on the
impact that certification fees have on the entry of low and high-quality producers.
3.4 Model
I present a simple model of certification, whose structure is motivated by the leading example
of organic farming. I start with a description of the demand side.
3.4.1 Consumers
I assume that there is a measure A of consumers, uniformly distributed along interval [0, A],
where x ∈ [0, A], represents the value of a high quality (organic) product for this consumer.
The value of low quality (regular) products is normalized to zero for all consumers. When
the price of a high quality product is p, all consumers with valuation x ≥ p will purchase it.
The demand is thus A− p for high quality products.
I assume that consumers are not able to distinguish the quality of the products. Thus, in
the case where consumers purchase on the market where both high and low quality products
may be traded but cannot be distinguished (i.e., for example when both high and low quality
products are certified due to mistakes in certification), the demand depends on the probability
s with which a consumer expects a product on this market to be of high quality. A consumer
of valuation x paying p for a product that is of high quality with probability s is willing to
purchase the product if
sx + (1− s)0− p ≥ 0.
The demand in such a situation would be then A − ps . I analyze the rational expectations
equilibria in which the consumers’ expectations about s are correct.
3.4.2 Producers
I assume that there are two types of potential producers. First, there is a potentially unlimited
(much larger than A) supply of producers who may produce only low quality products at
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zero cost. Second, there exists a measure A of producers, uniformly distributed along interval
[0, A], who may produce both low and high quality products. The position t ∈ [0, A] along the
interval describes the production costs of high quality products for this producer. Production
costs of low quality products are zero for all producers. Each producer makes one or zero
units of the good.
3.4.3 Two markets
There are two competitive markets,7 based on what consumers can observe. They cannot
observe the quality of the products but they observe whether a product is certified or not.
On the market of products without any certificate, the price has to be zero, because of the
potentially unlimited supply of low quality producers and zero entry costs to this market.
The price of goods on the certified market may be of course positive.
I denote a measure sh of high quality producers that obtain a certificate and sell their
products on the certified market. If no producers of low quality products obtain a certificate
and thus there are no certified low quality products, the probability that a certified product
is of high quality is equal to 1. However, if there is a positive measure of low quality products
with a certificate, the probability is lower than 1. In fact, the probability,8 which will be





In case there are no products on the market of certified products (both sh and sl are equal
to zero), I set s = 0.
3.4.4 Certification
To obtain a certificate, producers must undergo an imperfect (noisy) testing procedure that
costs f . For simplicity, I assume that mistakes happen with probability q < 12 . There can
be two types of mistakes—low quality products may obtain a certificate and high quality
producers may fail the test.9 Later, I extend the analysis to allow asymmetric errors. The
quality of testing technology, together with the number of high and low-quality producers
applying for a certificate will determine the “quality” of a certificate, i.e., the probability s
that a certified product is in fact of high quality. All players are assumed to be risk neutral.
For the following analysis, I assume that the fee for certification f and quality of the testing
q are given exogenously. That is, the decisions of the certifiers is not explicitly modelled.
Instead, I study how different fees and the quality of testing technology affect market outcomes
and welfare.
7The assumption that markets are competitive is reasonable due to the large number of producers and
consumers.
8A formally correct definition would require a complete specification of the sample space, σ-algebra and
measure P on this set. Defining standard Borel algebra on the set of real numbers [0, sh + sl] and setting the
appropriate measure would be sufficient. I omit the details.
9I also abstract from the legal enforcement of such restrictions and simply assume that no producer uses
the label without such a certificate. Even in the case where the owner of the label is not a government, there is
usually a sufficient legal protection (trademarks, etc.) that prevents producers from mis-using the certificate.
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3.4.5 Three equilibria
Three types of equilibria exist. First, if the certification fee f is very high, neither high nor
low quality producers will apply, and no certified products will be traded. The other two
equilibria are more interesting.
The participation of high quality producers depends on price p for which certified products
are sold, the probability that they will obtain a certificate, and the costs of certification and
production. Marginal high-quality producers have production costs sh
(1− q)p− f − sh = 0,
assuming that an outside option has zero value. Since all producers able to produce high
quality goods with lower costs than sh will apply for a certificate and produce the goods, the
measure10 of such producers is thus (1− q)p− f. There are no high-quality producers selling
organic products without a certificate since such products would be indistinguishable from (a
large number of) low-quality products and of zero price.
Since the testing technology is noisy and high quality production is expensive, some low-
quality producers may attempt to obtain a certificate. If these producers expect positive
profit pq − f > 0 from such an attempt, they will apply, until the expected profits return to
zero.
If expected profit of low-quality producers attempting to obtain a certificate is negative
pq − f < 0,
there will be only high-quality producers applying for a certificate in equilibrium. Note that
any applicant has to pay a fee, regardless of whether he obtains a certificate or not. This is
in fact how most certification systems work.
I analyze these types of equilibria separately, starting with the pooling one, in which
some low and high quality producers apply for a certificate. If the certification is too costly
(f > A(1 − q) ), there is no certification in the equilibrium. The other two types are more
interesting: a pooling and a separating equilibrium.
Pooling equilibrium
Since the expected profit on the uncertified market is zero, all low-quality producers have to be
indifferent between applying for a certificate and low-quality production. Market equilibrium
conditions then determine how many low-quality producers will apply. These conditions are:
• The participation of high quality producers
(1− q)p− f − sh = 0. (3.1)
• Zero profit of low-quality producers
pq − f = 0. (3.2)
10If the following expression is smaller then zero for certain values of q, p and f , the measure is defined to
be equal to zero, since no high quality producer will find it worth applying for a certificate and producing the
high quality goods. One can see on the figure 3.1 when this happens.
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• A definition of quality for the certificate (the probability that a product with a certificate
is in fact of high quality), depending on the probability of mistake q is
s =
(1− q)sh
(1− q)sh + qsl
. (3.3)
• Finally, the market equilibrium on the certified products market requires
A− p
s
= (1− q)sh + qsl, (3.4)
where sl is a measure of low-quality producers applying for a certificate, and sh is a
measure of high-quality producers. If the only solution of these equations is such that
s /∈ [0, 1], then the equilibrium does not exist.
Lemma 3.1 For any quality of testing technology q ∈ (0, 0.5), fee f∗ exists such that for
any f , 0 < f < f∗, there is an equilibrium with a positive measure of low-quality producers
attempting to obtain a certificate, where
f∗ = A
q
2q2 − 3q + 2
.
This function is increasing in q in the equilibrium. The equilibrium is described by equations
sl =
(1− 2q) (1− q)
q2 (2− 3q + 2q2)
(


















When the testing technology is perfect (q = 0), no low-quality producers will enter even
if it is costless to do so. As the technology becomes more imperfect, the chances of success
increase, and thus low-quality producers are willing to pay more for an attempt to get a
certificate.
Separating equilibrium
There is a separating equilibrium in which no low-quality producers apply for a certificate
because the expected profit from doing so is negative. In this equilibrium, the certification
perfectly separates high- and low-quality producers. I assume that high-quality producers
still fail certification tests with probability q. This assumption implies that certifiers do not
observe that only high-quality producers are applying for the certificate or are unable to
skip the testing. Thus, they conduct the tests of the same quality as when some low-quality
producers are applying.
Since there are no low-quality producers applying in a separating equilibrium, all certified
products are of high quality (s = 1). Since mistakes happen with probability q, only 1−q share
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of applying producers will obtain a certificate despite the fact that they are all high-quality
producers.11 The market equilibrium conditions are
A− p = (1− q)sh, (3.9)
(1− q)p− f − sh = 0. (3.10)
The constraint of this equilibrium is that the expected profit of low-quality producers is not
positive
qp ≤ f.
One can show that the condition that guarantees the existence of separating equilibria is
complementary to the existence of the condition of pooling equilibria.
Lemma 3.2 A lower and upper boundary on fee f exists so that an honest equilibrium exists
only for f between these boundaries. I denote the lower boundary by f∗ and the upper boundary
f∗∗. It holds that
f∗ = A
q
2q2 − 3q + 2
,
and
f∗∗ = A(1− q),
The price of organic products in the honest equilibrium is p = A+f(1−q)
(q−1)2+1 . The number of
high-quality producers applying for a certificate is
sh =
A(1− q)− f
(1− q)2 + 1
.
These results are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 For a combination of (f, q) such that f < A(1 − q), a unique equilibrium
exists.
• If f < A q
2q2−3q+2 in this equilibrium
12 some low-quality producers apply for a certificate.
• If f ≥ A q
2q2−3q+2 , then no low-quality producers apply, and thus, all certified products
are of high quality.
• If f > A(1− q), then no producers apply for a certificate in the equilibrium.
The partition of the parameter space is depicted on the figure 3.1.
Note that the equilibria coincide for f = A q
2q2−3q+2 . There are no low-quality producers
applying, but the their expected value of entry is zero. For f > A q
2q2−3q+2 , the expected
value for low-quality producers is strictly negative.
11This requires that certifiers are committed to do the tests. Without this commitment, there would be no
separating equilibrium.
12In a pooling equilibrium, there is an additional constraint p < A, which is equivalent to f < Aq. This
constraint is not binding because 2q2 − 3q + 2 > 1, and thus, I have
f ≤ A q
2q2 − 3q + 2 < Aq.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibria depending on certification fee f and probability of mistake q.
3.4.6 Welfare
In the previous section, I have shown that the certification fee determines whether low-quality
producers will apply for a certificate. For a fee sufficiently low, they will find it profitable to
do so. Yet, it is not obvious whether the benefits of a lower certification fee for high-quality
producers and consumers exceed the loss from low-quality products being certified. This
section analyzes where the welfare optimum lies.
I compute the welfare by finding consumers’ surplus and producers’ production costs. For
simplicity, I assume that low-quality products have zero value and that high quality producers
that do not obtain a certificate by error will sell their products to consumers who do not value
it. For now, I also assume that the testing technology is costless and certification fees are
thus mere transfers.











which in a separating equilibrium is
W s =
1
2 (q2 − 2q + 2)
(
A2 (1− q)2 − f2
)
. (3.11)

















2− 3q + 2q2
))
. (3.12)
The following results summarize the behavior of welfare.
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Lemma 3.3 Welfare in a separating equilibrium is decreasing in fee f, but increasing in f
in a pooling equilibrium.13 Since the equilibria coincide for f∗ = A q
2q2−3q+2 , this is where
the welfare is maximized. Welfare is increasing in quality q in both equilibria. When no
certification takes place, welfare is zero.
This result has an intuitive explanation. It is obvious that welfare improves when the cer-
tification fee is reduced in a separating equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium (or at the border
between a pooling and a separating equilibrium), when the certification fee is reduced, more
low quality producers find it profitable to enter the market, and if they obtain a certificate,
they sell the product and thus depress its price. Even though lower certification fees would,
ceteris paribus, attract more high-quality producers, the effect of the entry of low-quality
producers is stronger. Thus, some high quality producers are driven from the market, which
reduces welfare.
While the previous result assumes no certification costs, the result holds even for the
constant marginal cost of each test.
Lemma 3.4 If there are constant marginal costs for certification smaller than fee f , the
welfare optimal equilibrium does not change.
Proof. It is easy to show that in the case of constant marginal costs c, the partial derivative





q2 − 2q + 2
,
and thus the welfare is decreasing in f as long as c < f, in an honest equilibrium. A similar
analysis in the case of a cheating equilibrium shows that welfare is also highest for the highest
possible fee, as before. Since with such a fee the welfare in an honest equilibrium and a
cheating equilibrium coincide, the overall welfare optimum requires f = A q
2q2−3q+2 .
The assumption c < f is reasonable, since this is a necessary condition for certifiers
to make a positive profit. Therefore, for a given quality of testing technology, a welfare
optimizing regulator would attempt to reduce certification fees up to the point where low-
quality producers are indifferent between entering and staying out of the certified market but
do not actually enter.
The effect of competition
First, I discuss the results from the previous section in the case where the quality of the
testing technology q is given. I focus on the effect that the competition may have on the
certification fee.
Corollary 3.2 If competition between certifiers lowers the fee and does not change the quality
of testing, it is beneficial in separating equilibrium, but not in a pooling equilibrium. Moreover,
fees determine which equilibrium is viable. If fee f is too low, a separating equilibrium is not
viable.
13Welfare in a pooling equilibrium depends on f non-linearly, but it is easy to show that in the relevant
range of f , the welfare is increasing in f.
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Even if the competition between certifiers does not have any impact on the quality of the
technology q and just lowers the certification fee f , this result shows that “too much” competi-
tion reduces fee f below f∗ and encourages the entry of cheating producers. Even though high
quality producers benefit from a lower fee, the overall welfare effect is not positive—welfare
is maximized in the separating equilibrium with the lowest possible fee.
It is possible that for a given number of competing certifiers, both equilibria may be viable.
If all certifiers somehow coordinate on a high fee f , for a given quality q, no low-quality
producer will enter. Similarly, if certifiers coordinate on a low fee, low-quality producers
enter. One equilibrium may dominate the other in terms of welfare or the profits of the
certifiers.
Further motivation for introducing competition between certifiers comes from the conjec-
ture that lower fees will result in lower prices of certified products. It is easy to observe that
this is true in both equilibria. However, the welfare results show that lower prices do not
necessarily imply welfare improvement.
Corollary 3.3 Price is increasing in fee f in both equilibria. The share of high quality
products and the participation of high quality producers are increasing in fee f in a pooling
equilibrium, but the participation of low-quality producers is decreasing in f . The participation
of high quality producers in a separating equilibrium is decreasing in f.
This result confirms that the intuition that a lower fee decreases the prices of organic food
is correct, but it is incomplete. Lowering certification fees encourages the entry of low-quality
producers, which has overall negative consequences on welfare.
Certifiers’ revenue
In this section, I show that a monopoly, profit-maximizing certifier does not charge a welfare
optimal fee for a given quality of testing technology.14
Proposition 3.1 If the testing technology is costless, the fee that maximizes the total revenue






(1− 2q) (2− 3q + 2q2)
, for q < A
q
2q2 − 3q + 2
.
For q ≥ A q
2q2−3q+2 , the constraint f ≤ f
∗ = A q
2q2−3q+2 is binding. The fee that maximizes




A(1− q), for q < 0.37.
It easily follows that if the technology is costless, the highest possible revenue in separating
equilibrium is always bigger or equal to the revenue of all certifiers in pooling equilibrium.
Πp ≤ Πs.
This result shows that some competition is beneficial. A monopoly certifier that maximizes
its revenue (or profit, in the case of costless testing technology) will choose a welfare sub-
optimal fee. In the case of a separating equilibrium, the revenue maximizing fee is too large, as
expected. In the case of a pooling equilibrium, any fee consistent with a pooling equilibrium
is lower than the welfare optimal.
14A welfare maximizing not-for-profit certifier would choose the welfare optimal fee f∗ = Aq
2q2−3q+2 .
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3.4.7 Technology and competition
The previous section discusses the benefits of competition between certifiers if the quality of
testing technology is fixed. Because of the incentive structure, I will argue that this represents
an optimistic scenario and that one may expect a decrease in the quality of testing technology
when the competition becomes more intensive.
I assume that producers are not able to observe the quality of testing technology of
individual certifiers. High-quality producers have an incentive to find higher quality certifiers
because this reduces the probability of a mistakenly rejected application. However, this
is sensitive to the assumptions. For example, if a lower quality of testing simply means
less inspection, even high-quality producers might benefit from certification by a certifier of
lower quality. If testing technology is asymmetric and high-quality producers always pass the
certification test, regardless of the quality that only affects low-quality producers, there are
no incentives to learn about the quality of certification. Low-quality producers always have
the incentive to find a certifier of lower quality because this increases their chances of passing
the test.
Thus, one cannot hope that there would be a significant pressure from high-quality pro-
ducers to motivate certifiers to improve testing technology, especially if the errors do not harm
them. Competition may dilute the incentives of certifiers to invest into the quality of testing
technology. For example, if the certifiers have to first invest into testing technology before
they compete in prices, then a monopoly certifier would fully internalize the impact of quality
on demand for certificates. If there are competing certifiers, the better testing technology of
one certifier affects the revenue of all certifiers. More intensive price competition thus may
reduce the incentive of a certifier to invest. This argument requires that the overall demand
is increasing in the quality of the testing technology. I confirm that this is indeed true in a
separating equilibrium. It is also true in the pooling equilibrium for f = f∗, as long as the
quality of the testing technology is not too low.






(q2 − 2q + 2)2
(Aq(2− q) + 2f(1− q)) < 0
in a separating equilibrium, but not necessarily in a pooling one. For the highest possible fee,
f∗ = A q
2q2−3q+2 , which is consistent with the pooling equilibrium and the demand is increasing
in quality




q2 (2q2 − 3q + 2)2
(
−4q4 + 4q3 + 5q2 − 8q + 2
)
.
This expression is positive for a sufficiently low fee f.
A more general model of competition between certifiers will need to incorporate possibly
different certification fees and different qualities of the testing. This is beyond the scope of
the current paper.
3.4.8 Type I and type II errors
Previous analysis suggests that improving the testing technology always improves the welfare.
However, it seems possible that such an outcome is a consequence of a particular assumption
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about the testing technology—the fact that the probability of rejecting a high-quality producer
and awarding a certificate to a low-quality one is the same. Such symmetry in the technology
is certainly possible, but not likely. Therefore, I extend the model by distinguishing the
probabilities of “type I” and “type II” errors.15
I denote the probability that a high-quality producer does not pass the certification tests
as q1. The probability that a low-quality producer passes the test will be denoted by q2. The
analysis is very similar to the previous section, though slightly more technical. All three types
(separating, pooling, and no-certification) of equilibria still exist.
Pooling equilibrium
The basic results are very similar to the previous section.
Lemma 3.6 A pooling equilibrium exists for fee f, which is sufficiently low
f∗e = A
q2
−2q1 − q2 + q21 + q1q2 + 2
.


























In a separating equilibrium, the expected profit of low-quality producers is negative, while
a marginal high-quality producer makes zero profit. Thus, probability q2 determines the
viability of separating equilibria, while probability q1 determines its properties.
Lemma 3.7 For fee f bigger than f∗e ,
f∗e = A
q2
−2q1 − q2 + q21 + q1q2 + 2
,




(1− q1)2 + 1
.
15If one considers the testing procedure as a test with a null hypothesis of the “product is of high quality”,
then the probability of type I error is the probability that a high-quality product will be judged to be of low
quality (false positive). Type II error is then the probability that a low-quality producer will be judged to be
of high quality (false negative).
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Welfare
Since I distinguish two types of errors, I may study which error has a bigger influence on
welfare. If it is technically possible to reduce q1 or q2, such a result tells us where one should
focus the bigger investment.





q21 − 2q1 + 2
) (A2 (q1 − 1)2 − f2) .
Improving the quality of testing technology increases the welfare.
∂W se
∂q1
= (q1 − 1)
A2 + f2(
q21 − 2q1 + 2
)2 < 0.
In the pooling equilibrium, first derivatives of the welfare function are quite technical, and
I therefore present those in a special case q = q1 = q2. The welfare function itself is
Lemma 3.9 Welfare is increasing in f in the relevant range. Reducing the probability of















for any f ≤ f∗ = A q
2q2−3q+2 , q < 0.5.
These results assume that the testing technology is costless and suggest that if the marginal
improvement of the testing technology is equally costly if q1 = q2, then it is welfare optimal
to reduce q2 instead of q1, in the pooling equilibrium. In a separating equilibria, q2 only
co-determines whether separating equilibrium is viable. Still, it might be more beneficial to
reduce q2, which allows separating equilibrium for the lower fee f.
Lemma 3.10 If high-quality producers always pass the test (q1 = 0), then the marginal effect
on welfare from an increase in q2 is bigger than q1 if Af is high and q2 is small.
16
If Af is high, the value of high-quality products is high relative to the certification fees.
Thus, not certifying high-quality producers is more harmful than erroneously certifying low-
quality ones. Also, if the probability of error for low-quality producers (q2) is already high, a
further marginal increase has a lower impact than the same marginal change in q1.
16Note that increasing qi means that the technology gets worse as qi denotes the probability of the error.
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Quality of testing and the type of equilibria
The borderline fee f∗e that separates the pooling and separating equilibria depends on both
q1 and q2 :
f∗e = A
q2
−2q1 − q2 + q21 + q1q2 + 2
.
Lemma 3.11 Improving technology (lowering q1 or q2) lowers the borderline fee f∗e . More-
over, lowering q2 always reduces the fee f∗ more.
This results show that reducing the type II error (q2) thus reduces the optimal fee f∗e more
than reducing the type I error.
Profits and quality of technology
Let’s analyze the incentives that the certifiers’ industry has for investment into testing tech-
nology. Revenues of certifiers in separating equilibria are
Πh = f
A(1− q1)− f





q21 − 2q1 + 2
)2 (−2f(1− q1)−Aq1(2− q1)) < 0.
So certifiers have some incentives to invest into the testing technology, although it is not clear
whether they are sufficient.
In a pooling equilibrium, the situation is even less clear.
Lemma 3.12 Improving testing technology in a pooling equilibrium increases the total profit
of certifiers only if the technology is already sufficiently good and certification fees are high
enough. For example, at fee f∗e , any improvement in the testing technology increases the profit
of the certifiers for q < q∗∗.
These results suggest that a monopoly certifier would have some positive incentives to in-
vest into testing technology. Competition between certifiers is likely to dilute these incentives
as there are positive externalities from investment that cannot be fully internalized.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the adverse selection of low-quality producers in imperfect certification.
The previous literature (Strausz, 2005) shows that high fees are required to keep a certifier
honest. On top of that, I show that high certification fees also discourage the entry of low-
quality producers. In the case of imperfect testing technology, this improves the reliability of
the certificate and is in fact welfare improving.
I applied this result in discussing the extent to which competition between certifiers low-
ering certification fees is optimal. I show that a monopoly certifier chooses a too-high certifi-
cation fee, but achieves separation. Introducing too many competing certifiers may lower the
certification fee below the minimal level consistent with the welfare optimal result and thus
be harmful.
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I also extend the model to allow for the different probability of type I and type II errors.
I show that reducing any type of error is welfare improving. In an equilibrium, where some
low-quality producers apply for a certificate, reducing the probability that such producers
would succeed in certification increases the welfare more than reducing the probability that
a high-quality producer will fail the certification process. Intuition for this result comes from
the fact that not admitting a high-quality producer harms marginal consumers, who have
the lowest valuation of organic food, but admitting low quality producers harms the average
consumer, which translates into a lower price of certified products and thus harms other
producers. In a separating equilibrium, reducing the type II error reduces the minimal fee
consistent with separation more than reducing the type I error does, but this does not have a
direct effect on welfare. I also show that the overall revenues of certifiers are decreasing in the
type I error in a separating equilibrium, which suggests that certifiers have some incentives
to improve the testing technology. Even though I do not model the competition between
certifiers explicitly, I argue that competition reduces these incentives and thus may lead to a
lower investment into testing technology.17
The main drawback of this analysis comes from the lack of an explicit model of competition
both in prices and quality of testing. While I argue that simply to lower the fee reduces the
viability of a separating equilibrium, it is likely that competition also reduces the incentives to
invest into testing technology and thus leads to lower quality. This would have two negative
effects. The first is similar to a reduction in fee f , and impacts the viability of the separating
equilibrium. The other impact is direct—I have shown that welfare is affected negatively if
the quality of testing technology decreases.
Another limitation of this analysis comes from the fact that I model quality q and certi-
fication fee f as uniform across certifiers. It is not trivial to see how producers would behave
in an environment in which they can choose from a menu of certifiers with different testing
technologies and different fees. Moreover, it is not clear how the certifiers should choose the
quality of the testing technology and price their services.
I have also assumed that all producers applying for a certificate pay the same certification
fee f . Other assumptions are clearly possible. For example, producers that successfully obtain
a certificate may be granted a partial refund of the certification fee. This would increase the
payoff for both high- and low-quality producers. Because of the higher probability of success of
high-quality producers, the effect would be stronger for them than for low-quality producers.
The region of the separating equilibria would thus be larger. Depending on the size of the
refund, the region of no viable certification would shrink. One might also consider a fine for
unsuccessful producers, which would be very similar to the partial refund of the certification
fee f .
Finally, I have assumed commitment to a given quality of testing technology q. Given the
structure of, for example, organic certification, it is clear that to sustain a low probability of
error and thus a low pass-rate for low quality (non-organic) producers, some supervision of
the certifiers must be in place. The current requirements on certifiers mostly focus on their
qualification, but very little is known about the actual supervision. A deeper understanding
of how supervision should work and how much is required will help us to understand more
issues of competition between certifiers. Since certifier profits are likely to increase when the
17The intuition is clear. If each certifier has a smaller market share, improving the technology benefits not
only him, but other certifiers as well. Since he cannot internalize these benefits as a single monopoly certifier
would, one can expect lower investment in equilibrium when more competitors are present.
3.6. APPENDIX 91
competition intensifies, the results of Strausz (2005) suggest that it may be harder to sustain
honesty certification.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It is trivial to verify that equations (3.1-3.4) have a solution (3.5-
3.8). The upper bound on fee f∗ comes from the condition that a non-negative number of
low-quality producers applies for a certificate
(1− 2q) (1− q)
q2 (2− 3q + 2q2)
(
Aq − f(2− 3q + 2q2)
)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ f ≤ Aq
2− 3q + 2q2
.
For a boundary value of fee f∗ = Aq
2−3q+2q2 , no low-quality producers apply for a certificate and
the expected value of doing so is zero. For higher fees, the expected value of an application
is negative for low-quality producers.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. In a separating equilibrium, it has to be true that no low-quality
producer applies for a certificate. This happens when the expected value of doing so is negative
(pq − f < 0) . Then, there are no low-quality producers having a certificate (s = 1). The
equilibrium conditions then become simply (3.9-3.10). The value of fee f is constrained by
the condition pq − f < 0. The other condition in equilibrium guarantees that in a separating
equilibrium, high-quality producers prefer to apply for a certificate. If f = p = A(1 − q),
then only the high-quality producer will apply for a certificate since his production costs are
zero, certification costs and expected revenue are equal to A(1 − q). This clearly describes
the extreme value of f. For any fee higher than A(1 − q), no certification can take place in
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. First, let’s derive the function of total welfare. Since both the price
of goods and the price of certification represent a transfer, I can compute the welfare as the















The welfare function in a separating and pooling equilibrium can be easily derived by plugging
in the equilibrium values of the relevant variables (s, p, sh).












2q2 − 3q + 2
(





∂f is positive if
f ≤ Aq −6q + 5q
2 − 2q3 + 3
4 + 16q2 − 8q3 − 14q
.
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Since in a pooling equilibrium for any fee f such that
f < f∗ =
Aq
2q2 − 3q + 2
≤ Aq −6q + 5q
2 − 2q3 + 3
4 + 16q2 − 8q3 − 14q
,
the welfare in a pooling equilibrium is increasing in f.






) q − 1






q3 (2q2 − 3q + 2)2
(fX + AqY )) < 0, and
X = 4 + 41q2 − 46q3 + 28q4 − 8q5 − 20q,
Y = 9q − 10q2 + 13q4 − 12q5 + 4q6 − 3.
The expression ∂W
p
∂q is negative if
f < Aq
(−9q + 10q2 − 13q4 + 12q5 − 4q6 + 3)
(4 + 41q2 − 46q3 + 28q4 − 8q5 − 20q)
.
As before, it holds that
f∗ =
Aq
2q2 − 3q + 2
≤ Aq (−9q + 10q
2 − 13q4 + 12q5 − 4q6 + 3)
(4 + 41q2 − 46q3 + 28q4 − 8q5 − 20q)
,
and thus welfare is decreasing in the probability of error q (or increasing in the quality of
testing technology 1− q) in the relevant range of fees.








− s2h)− c(sl + sh).





q2 − 2q + 2





q2 − 2q + 2
< 0.








2q2 − 3q + 2
(
(c− f)(4 + 16q2 − 8q3 − 14q) + Aq(3− 6q + 5q2 − 2q3)
)
,
which is positive because
Aq
(3− 6q + 5q2 − 2q3)
4 + 16q2 − 8q3 − 14q
> Aq
1
2q2 − 3q + 2
> f∗ > f − c.
Thus, the welfare optimum does not change as long as the constant marginal costs of testing
are smaller than the fee f.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Let’s compute
the total revenues of all certifiers, or their profits in the case of costless testing technology in
a separating and pooling equilibria:
Πs = fsh = f
A(1− q)− f
(1− q)2 + 1
;
Πp = f(sl + sh) = f
2q − 1
2q4 − 3q3 + 2q2
(
2f + Aq2 + 8fq2 − 4fq3 −Aq − 7fq
)
.
Taking a partial derivative with respect to f gives the first order conditions
∂Πs
∂f
= −2f −A + Aq








2q2 − 3q + 2
(
4f + Aq2 + 16fq2 − 8fq3 −Aq − 14fq
)
.
The maximum is reached at fΠs =
1





(1− 2q) (2− 3q + 2q2)
.
Note that fΠp is constrained from above by the condition f ≤ f∗ = A
q
2q2−3q+2 . This constraint
is binding from q = 13 . Similarly, f
Π
s is bounded from below by the same expression:
1
2
(1− q) = q
2q2 − 3q + 2






q2 − 2q + 2
,
Πpmax = A
2 (q − 1)
2
16q4 − 48q3 + 68q2 − 48q + 16
.
It is easy to verify that the maximal profit in the separating equilibrium is higher than in
the pooling up to q∗.
(q − 1)2




q2 − 2q + 2
for q ≤ qast
For q ≥ q∗, the profits coincide.18
Proof of Lemma 3.5. The behavior of the demand for certification in separating equilib-
rium is simply a derivative of the number of certified high-quality producers. Computing the
derivative of the number of high- and low-quality producers in a pooling equilibrium, one gets
∂ (sh + sl)
∂q
= − 1
q3 (2q2 − 3q + 2)2
(Aq(11q2 − 6q − 12q3+
18Note that formally, one should show that the expression for profits obtained here is indeed maximum.
This requires a verification that the second order condition with respect to f is negative in the relevant range,
which is rather easy to verify.
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+2 + 4q4) + f(−8− 82q2 + 92q3 − 56q4 + 16q5 + 40q)).
For the borderline fee, f = Aq 1
2q2−3q+2 , this expression is




q2 (2q2 − 3q + 2)2
(
−4q4 + 4q3 + 5q2 − 8q + 2
)
, and
is positive for q < 0.33. The demand is thus decreasing in quality up to this point.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. I state the equilibrium equations. Solving them is standard. The
participation decision of high-quality producers depends on the probability that they will fail
the certification test
(1− q1)p− f − sh = 0.
The second constraint requires zero profit for low-quality producers, depending on the prob-
ability that a low-quality producer will succeed in the test
pq2 − f = 0.
The definition of the quality of the certificate (the probability that a product with a certificate
is in fact of high-quality), depending on the probabilities of mistakes q1 and q2 is
s =
(1− q1)sh
(1− q1)sh + q2sl
.
Finally, market equilibrium requires
A− p
s
= (1− q1)sh + q2sl.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2, replace q with q1 except for the
definition of f∗ from the previous Lemma.
Proofs of Lemma 3.8 and 3.9. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 3.3 and
3.4 and requires only trivial algebraic manipulations.








q2 (1− q1) (1− q1 − q2)
q21 − q2 − 2q1 + q1q2 + 2
(
q21 − q2 − 2q1 + q1q2 + 3
)
− f (1− q1 − q2)2
)
.

















q32 (−q2 + 2)
2
(
−4f + 3Aq2 + 8fq2 − 3Aq22 + Aq32 − 5fq22 + fq32
)
.

















q2 (q2 − 2)
5Aq2 − 4f + 6fq2 − 4Aq22 + Aq32 − 2fq22
3Aq2 − 4f + 8fq2 − 3Aq22 + Aq32 − 5fq22 + fq32
.
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6Aq2 − 8f + 8fq2 − 4Aq22 + Aq32 − 2fq22
)
≤ 0.
This condition is equivalent to the condition
A
f
≥ 8− 8q2 + 2q
2
2
6q2 − 4q22 + q32
.
or again, that the q2 is small and Af is large, as required in the theorem. Note that this
condition is more strict than the condition from the previous footnote.
Proof of Lemma 3.11 and 3.12. The proof of these lemmas is straightforward. For Lemma
3.12, use q∗∗ = 0.28.




4− 8q2 + 5q22 − q32
q2 (−3q2 + q22 + 3)
.
96 CHAPTER 3. IMPERFECT CERTIFICATION
Bibliography
Biglaiser, G., and J. W. Friedman (1994): “Middlemen as guarantors of quality,” Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 509–531.
De, S., and P. Nabar (1991): “Economic implications of imperfect quality certification,”
Economics Letters, 37(4), 333–337.
Epstein, G. S., and I. N. Gang (2002): “The political economy of Kosher wars,”
Internet:ftp://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/2002-27.pdf, Inocomics.
European Commission (2005a): “List of bodies or public authorities in charge of
inspection provided for in article 15 of regulation (EEC) No 2092/91,” http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:016:0001:0020:EN:PDF, Official
Journal C 016.
(2005b): “Report on the supervision of inspection bodies and authorities of the
Member States according to Article 15 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 on organic
production,” Internet:http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/qual/organic/control/report art15
en.pdf, Last accessed: April 26, 2008.
Franzoni, L. A. (1998): “Imperfect competition in certification markets,” Inter-
net:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=94052.
Klein, B., and K. B. Leffler (1981): “The role of market forces in assuring contractual
performance,” The Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 615–641.
Lizzeri, A. (1999): “Information revelation and certification intermediaries,” The RAND
Journal of Economics, 30(2), 214–231.
New Yorker (2006): “Paradise sold,” http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/05/15/060515crat atlarge,
Last accessed: May 11, 2008.
Organic Trade Association (2007): “Organic trade association’s 2007 manufacturer sur-
vey,” Internet:http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/2007ExecutiveSummary.pdf, Last ac-
cessed: April 25, 2008.
Strausz, R. (2005): “Honest certification and the threat of capture,” International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 23(1–2), 45–62.
Svitkova, K., and A. Ortmann (2006): “Certification as a viable quality as-
surance mechanism: theory and suggestive evidence,” Internet:http://www.cerge-
ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp288.pdf, CERGE-EI Working paper 288.
97
98 BIBLIOGRAPHY
USDA (2008a): “Certification – preamble,” Internet:
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3003513, Last ac-
cessed: April 28, 2008.
(2008b): “Labeling packaged products,” Inter-
net:http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004323, Last
accessed: April 25, 2008.
(2008c): “National organic program: suspensions and revocations,” Inter-
net:http://tinyurl.com/3k2nvy, Last accessed: April 25, 2008.
(2008d): “Organic production and handling standards,” Inter-
net:http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004445, Last
accessed: April 25, 2008.
(2008e): “U.S. certified organic farmland acreage, livestock numbers, and farm
operations, 1992-2005,” Internet:http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Organic/Data/Farmland
%20livestock%20and%20farm%20ops%2092-05.xls, Last accessed: April 25, 2008.
Viscusi, W. K. (1978): “A note on ‘lemons’ markets with quality certification,” The Bell
Journal of Economics, 9(1), 277–279.
